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This paper focuses on and compares dimensions of
Argentine and Brazilian foreign policy in the international
system, coupled with changes in their domestic and regional
politics. Both countries have adopted independent foreign
policy strategies aimed toward regional and global inter-
dependence. Their pursuit of independent action has tended
to ignore United States influence unless it coincided with
perceptions of their national interests. These strategies
have resulted in marked diversification of contacts with
other nations, both developing and developed. Additionally,
these traditional rivals acknowledge the benefits to be
gained politically and economically by cooperating. In
final, assessment of their bids for independence and self-
sufficiency have only highlighted Argentine and Brazilian
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I. INTRODUCTION
Latin American nations by the end of the 1960s focused
on a new set of nationalistic foreign and domestic policies,
which were developed to combat their perceived unacceptable
dependence on the United States. Latin American governments
sought to dilute and lessen their economic and political
dependence on the collosus to the North. Most pre-1970
literature on Latin America centered on the predominant
position accorded the United States and its primary influ-
ence over Latin America countries, while little recognition
was given to individual Latin American countries or their
collective impact on foreign policy decision-making. Latin
American foreign policy may be analyzed in two eras: 1)
hemispheric security and economic integration in the 1950s,
which evolved into developmental nationalism in the 1960s;
and, 2) regional and global interdependence in the 1970s
and 1980s. 1
The foreign policy goals and actions of the United
States were primary elements in formulating Latin American
national policies in the 1950s and 1960s. Latin American
nations were drawn into the Cold War as allies of the United
States in its campaign against the spreading virus of commu-
nism. An interAmerican system evolved which melded United
States interests into a broad spectrum of Latin American

society, including the military, diplomatic, and economic
sectors. The system was linked militarily by a shared per-
ception of the Soviet Union as the major external threat to
the area. This perception led to a mutual defense agreement
signed in 1946. The InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Pact) included the following principal
objectives:
...protecting the sources of strategic material and the
lines of access to them; maintaining a capacity to
defend the region against small aircraft and submarine
attacks from the outside; and reducing the role of the
U.S. armed forces in regional defense.
The Rio Pact involved the United States in hemispheric
cooperation. Shortly after the Pact's ratification the
Organization of American States (OAS) was formed in 1948, as
a diplomatic alliance to "promote the peaceful settlement of
...international disputes and to encourage. .. international
trade."-* Latin American's looked upon this alliance as an
assist to the economic and social development of their
region, rather than the United States' original concept of
the alliance as a means to combat communist influence and
preserve American interests. 4
Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba in the early 1960s
and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led to changes in the
interAmerican system. Increased military assistance to
Latin America from the Kennedy administration was concurrent
with the Alliance for Progress, which emphasized social and
economic aid. Latin American countries sought to increase
8

their levels of economic development through direct invest-
ment by foreign companies, resulting in increased
multinational corporate penetration of the region.
5
Many Latin American governments looked upon economic
integration as a vehicle to accelerate their economic devel-
opment. Concepts of regional cooperation assumed new impor-
tance as the United States seemed inclined to emphasize more
mutual defense and less economic development of the region.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA) proposed a concept for regional economic cooperation
in Latin America based on the Western European model for
free trade. The organizations which eventually emerged from
this proposal were: the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) in February 1960 by the Treaty of
Montevideo, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
Peru and Uruguay (later joined by Colombia, Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Bolivia in 1968); and the Central American
Common Market (CACM) in December 1969 by the Treaty of
Managua, by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua. *>
Latin American countries were discouraged by the results
of integration as a means of accelerating their economic
development, and the alternative strategy of developmental
nationalism looked attractive. This strategy is based on
sharing (but not "pooling") national resources and on
industrializing individual national economics through

"balanced and controlled interdependence". Both nation-
alism" and "integration" may be viewed as conflicting
concepts, yet Dreier suggests that:
...nationalism actually contributes, however, illogi-
cally, to the movement for regional integration. For
although it is true that nationalism often erects
barriers to regional economic agreements, it is also
true that nationalism enthusiasm for economic develop-
ment leads to the positive support of integration as an
essential goal.^
One explanation for the relatively unsuccessful integra-
tion attempts of these two efforts holds that the disparate
sizes and levels of economic development of the Latin
American nations is a severe obstacle to economic integra-
tion. Due to their relative size and more developed
economic base, both Argentina and Brazil have maximized and
used the LAFTA to their advantage. The Andean Pact states
of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru were dis-
satisfied with the distribution of benefits within LAFTA and
expected that their progress would be greater within a group
that excluded Argentina and Brazil.
The Andean Pact demonstrates a trend toward regional
organizations which more closely meet Latin American
developmental priorities than the application of integration
theories based on European experience. Latin American
governments have used the Pact as an instrument to coordi-
nate their foreign policies and increase their power and
visibility on the international scene. Other subregional
10

groups, such as the La Plata Basin Group, have been formed
in Latin America to develop international water resources
and hydroelectric power. 8
Literature of the 1950s and 1960s analyzed Latin
American policies in the context of their dependency upon
the United States, while literature since 1970 has focused
upon emerging Latin American foreign policies in terms of
regional and global interdependence. If interdependence
connotes the ability of one state to affect another, then
the nations of Latin America are clearly moving toward
regional and global interdependence in the international
system of the 1980s. 9
This paper focuses on and compares Argentine and
Brazilian foreign policy changes in the international sys-
tem, coupled with changes in their domestic politics which
have resulted in the adoption of independent foreign policy
strategies aimed toward regional and global interdependence.
The objective of this paper will be to demonstrate how both
Argentina and Brazil have used a foreign policy strategy
based on both regional and global interdependence to counter
United States influence in Latin America. Argentina and
Brazil pursue similar foreign policy goals in their desire
to achieve independent action and lessen their dependency.
These are:
1 . Independent recognition in the international system;
11

2. Cultivation of diplomatic and economic exchanges
with a diversity of countries;
3. Use of strategies to increase their own self-
sufficiency and independence of action; and
4. Increased interaction at both regional and global
levels.
Both Argentina and Brazil rely on anti-dependency strat-
egies, as evidenced by their current expansion in regional
and global foreign policy interactions. Succeeding chapters
will analyze and compare those dimensions of the increased
interaction on both national and international, diplomatic
and economic levels.
Argentina and Brazil pursue independent foreign policy
strategies and base their individual actions on what gives
them the most significant advantage.
12
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF A DOMESTIC BASE FOR
INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY ACTION
A. POLITICAL STRUCTURES
Coups brought the military to power in Argentina and
Brazil in the 1960s, where the military has traditionally
influenced domestic politics. The Argentine and Brazilian
governments consist of a military authoritarian coalition
directed by military officers, assisted by civilian tech-
nocrats. Both have designated one military leader to serve
as President, who can easily be deposed if the need arises.
Formation of social and economic policy relies heavily upon
the Presidents' civilian advisors and implementation of
their programs depends on government bureaucracies. The
President can make political appointments, yet little can be
accomplished without the support of civil servants at
national and local levels. Argentina and Brazilian military
leaders and their civilian advisors have blamed inflation
and economic disorder on the demagogic wage and welfare
policies of civilian politicians. Economic growth could be
achieved only if such policies were suspended until each
country's productive capacity was increased substantially.
Implementation of this policy required repression of all
groups expressing demands for a larger share of the national
wealth to be given to the masses. 1
14

The military leaders of Argentina and Brazil accepted
the notion that the state should determine the rules of the
economic game and use its power to direct their nation's
development. Argentina and Brazil chose a conservative
modernization strategy, emphasing capital accumulation and
heavy industrialization. Brazil's assumption of a conserva-
tive modernization strategy has not been achieved without
high costs. Use of authoritarian methods to impose harsh
austerity and encourage domestic and foreign investments in
industry and commercial agriculture achieved one of the
highest rates of growth in the hemisphere. These methods
also postponed efforts to solve the critical social problems
which still plague the country. The bounty of the Brazilian
economic miracle only benefited the already affluent middle
and upper class minority.
^
By contrast the Argentine developmental experience has
been nowhere as impressive or durable as Brazil's, yet their
achievements are considerable. The strategy and tactics
that worked for Brazil were unsuccessful in Argentina.
Unlike Brazilian workers, who were highly dependent on the
state and lacked strong organizations, the Argentine working
class was well-organized and extremely militant. Whereas in
Brazil the military could draw upon the resources of a well-
established tradition of authoritarianism and state pater-
nalism, in Argentina labor was determined to secure the
return of Peron to power, the state was distrusted by most
15

entrepreneurs, and the population was still intensely
divided between Peronists and anti-Peronists . Argentina
faced a much more difficult task than Brazil in bringing
economic growth and political order to the country.
Comparison of the Argentine and Brazilian military
governments reflects remarkable convergence in their foreign
policies, illustrated by their shared classification in the
world economy as newly industrializing states, their need
for nonpoliticized trade, and their drive to establish an
independent capacity for the protection of their national
security interests. All these factors are present to some
degree wherever the military comes to power in the more
advanced countries of the Third World.
4
The military governments in Argentina and Brazil have
experienced difficulty in developing a self-justifying
ideology for permanently exercising power. The use of a
"national security" doctrine concentrating on internal and
external subversive threats has lost creditability over time
and no longer gives adequate rationale for permanent mili-
tary rule. Both military governments have been obliged to
promise an eventual return to democracy. Fulfillment of
this promise gets closer as perception of their regimes*
strength erodes. Argentina has accomplished much by using
force to silence organized opposition, but has experienced
difficulty in building a firm basis for majority support or
establishing military rule beyond de facto status into
16

institutionalized, legitimate authority. The 1982 Falklands
War badly tarnished the Argentine military image, yet no
viable civilian alternatives surfaced. In the aftermath
Argentina has been attempting to recreate a more solid,
institutional foundation.
5
Brazil in the 1980s has already commenced gradual trans-
fer of power to civilian institutions. Some opposition and
dissent always managed to survive against the authoritarian
government, despite often brutal and notorious efforts to
curtail certain types of political activity. The opposi-
tion's strength grew to the point where the current military
president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, was forced to preside
over a government sponsored democratization plan known as
"abertura" or "opening". As the Brazilian economic
miracle began to slow down in the middle 1970s, the military
government lost one of its principle justifications for con-
tinued rule in its claim for superior ability to foster
continued economic development. Some military officers and
their civilian allies viewed former President Geisel's
policy of slowly moving toward democracy (decompressao) as
merely providing an additional basis for legitimacy of the
military government and as a vehicle to increase the
regime's popular support. 7 On November 15, 1982 elections
were held in Brazil for the first time in twenty years; how-
ever, President Figueiredo' s administration is carefully
producing its own version of democracy. There seems to be
17

an ever-growing, affluent middle class opposition provoked
by the precarious economic conditions in Brazil. The
Figueiredo government has been attempting to deal with an
inflation rate just under 100 percent and an astronomic
foreign debt.**
Argentina and Brazil will continue to be ruled by
authoritarian regimes, possessing the trappings of demo-
cratic nations. Time will demonstrate if the powerful focus
on political liberation will be recognized and accommodation
made to meet the growing demands. Present in both Argentina
and Brazil are opponents who oppose and reject the idea of
democratic processes for their country. The legitimacy of
the Argentine and Brazilian military regimes faces increas-
ing odds and the flexibility demonstrated by each government
will inevitably determine their future existence. Further-
more, the governments of Argentina and Brazil must
satisfactorily handle mounting foreign and domestic debts.
B. ECONOMIC BASE
During the 1970s, Brazil developed into the tenth
largest economy in the world, with the thirteenth largest
industrial sector. Its export value increased from $2.74
billion in 1970 to $15.04 billion in 1979. In 1979, 63.8
percent of its imports were conducted with partners outside
the hemisphere. 9 Traditionally Brazil's economy was based
on natural resources and agriculture, while the present
18

focus is on industrial development. Major industries
include petrochemicals, shipbuilding, automative and steel.
In general, Brazil's foreign trade policy has been to reduce
imports and increase exports. A number of restrictions have
been imposed on nonessential imports and total prohibition
has occurred on some items.
^
The Brazilian government has never sought to discourage
foreign investment; nevertheless, it has favored attracting
longterm investors who will contribute to Brazilian economic
development. Brazilian controlled joint ventures are empha-
sized as the most acceptable vehicle for foreign investment.
If new technology is involved, Brazilian government policy
has been to induce development with Brazil. Under the fed-
eral constitution, the only industry specifically excluded
from private enterprise has been the exploration and drill-
ing of oil, a monopoly of the federal government. Currently,
some foreign corporations are exploring for oil under
contract with the state petroleum company, Petrobras. 11
Brazil has been experiencing its worse economic reces-
sion since the 1930s. The balance of payments remained in
deficit in 1981 by some ten billion, despite doubling of
exports between 1978 and 1981. Since 1973, Brazil has sus-
tained a growth rate of almost seven percent, nonwithstand-
ing the world recession and Brazil's ever-larger need for
oil imports. 12 Brazil's inflation in 1981 was barely
under 100 percent. While international interest makes
19

borrowing costly, Brazil must borrow to finance both its
continued growth and foreign debt which is more than $60
billion. A one percentage point change in interest rates
produces a $400-$500 million impact on the country's balance




Brazil has concentrated tremendous effort into diver-
sifying exports in recent years. From 1968-1973, its manu-
factured exports grew an average of 52 percent per year.
Agricultural commodities in Brazil have demonstrated an
ability to be "fast on their feet". When there was a need
for soybeans, Brazil became one of the world's greatest
producers of soybean almost overnight. Brazil presently
competes with the United States in every major agricultural
product except wheat. ^ In contrast Argentine exports
are less diversified than Brazil's. Beet, wheat, corn, and
hides account for about 60 percent of Argentina's earnings,
and these markets are unstable. This provides Argentina
with far less flexibility to deal with economic problems
than Brazil. Traditional Brazilian products, by comparison,
accounted for only 37 percent of Brazil's export earnings in
the 1970s. Although Argentina experienced an increase in
its manufactured exports, Brazil outperformed Argentina




Average Annual Rates of Growth of Manufactured
Exports for Selected Countries in Latin America
1968-73





Source : Based on U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics
(1968-1973)
Argentina experienced a severe economic crisis in 1975-
1976. Bankruptcies, strikes, and capital flight dislocated
production
. in the private sector. Manufacturing activity
dropped 3.2 percent, gross investment dropped 16 percent,
and the overall gross domestic product dropped 2 percent as
compared to the previous year. Argentina has encountered
more economic instability than Brazil. Agriculture con-
tinues to be Argentina's major source of wealth, exports,
and world economic importance. Brazil has been rapidly sur-
passing Argentina as a food exporter. Argentina's foreign
trade position is volatile given its dependence on a few
exportable agricultural products, and the linkage of imports
21

to semicontrollable internal factors such as industrializa-
tion, and the political struggle between urban and rural
groups, organized labor and other sectors. 16
With a population of 28 million, Argentineans have the
highest standard of living and literacy rate in Latin
America. In mineral and energy resources and in reserves of
skilled manpower it ranks among the world's second group of
industrial countries. Thirty years of political turmoil and
economic mismanagement, and four years of demoralizing urban
terrorism and savage government have produced serious
imbalances. Brazil and Mexico have surpassed Argentina in
overall economic power. A drop in per capita gross national
product has lowered Argentina's world ranking from fifteenth
to thirty-seventh. Although things looked brighter in the
late 1970s, the picture was bleaker by 1980. Economic
growth dropped from 7.1 percent in 1979 to 1.0 percent in
1980. Inflation was projected at 105 percent in 1981 from a
low point of 88 percent in 1980. Argentina has been geared
to continuing inflation. 1 ' The Falklands War swelled
Argentina's budget deficit by at least 350 million, hampered
the country's exports, and dried up the international loan
market for a period. The country then owed $34 billion, or
$7 billion more than Poland. It will be a long time before
Argentina recuperates from its losses. As of August, 1981,




Argentina and Brazil must export to survive. Both
nations are very aware of the need for continued expansion
of their export markets and have actively emphasized
cultivation of export markets for their manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods. Regional cooperation and bilateral
trade agreements between other countries and between them-
selves have been the means used to combat worsening economic
conditions and to promote continued economic development.
Both military regimes in Argentina and Brazil owe much of
their legitimacy to their continued capability to promote
further economic growth and development. Diplomacy has
become a tool to open up new markets and for maintenance of
existing markets for export trade, which is essential for
their continued economic well-being. Neither Argentina or
Brazil can afford to alienate its Latin American neighbors
as a vast majority of goods are sold to other Latin American
countries. They both strive internationally to maintain a
favorable atmosphere for continued foreign investment and a
favorable financial rating with the international lending
establishment. Each must diversify their trading partners
to lessen their dependence on any one nation and to increase
their independence from the United States.
1 . Energy
Argentina ranks as developed when measured in terms
of its energy production and consumption. In 1965,
Argentina ranked thirteenth in world usage per capita, while
23

Brazil lagged far behind. Abundance of resources ranked
Argentina above its peer countries in domestic energy and
demonstrated its potential for independence. In 1976,
Argentina imported 13 percent of its petroleum needs as com-
pared to 12 percent in 1974. It was estimated that
Argentina possessed oil reserves of 398 million cubic
meters. The Videla government promoted national self-
sufficiency and encouraged foreign participation in
petroleum exploration. 19
Brazil has been making an all-out effort to overcome
its dependence on imported petroleum. During 1970-1977,
Brazil wrestled with problems of stagnant oil production,
increasing consumption of most petroleum products, and
increasing expenditures on crude oil imports. Crude oil
production decreased 4 percent from 1976-1977. In 1977, the
Brazilian government announced several measures to both re-
strain domestic consumption and increase production of
fuels. The government compaign achieved a 4 percent de-
crease in gasoline consumption during that year. Gasoline
sold in Brazil has a mandatory 10 percent alcohol
content. 20
High costs of foreign oil essential for operating
Brazilian industries has exacerbated Brazil's present
economic situation. Brazil has been forced to search for
alternative energy sources both at home and abroad. Brazil
sought to develop nuclear capability in the form of breeder
24

reactors in hopes of becoming self-sufficient in energy.
Brazil has also developed an energy policy with regards to
hydroelectric power. 21
In 1979, President Figueiredo of Brazil announced a
new campaign to create a "war economy" to combat the accel-
erating oil deficit, estimated at between $7 and $7.5
billion that year. This program included provisions for
gasoline rationing and substantially higher prices for
diesel and automobile fuels. Special emphasis was accorded
to Proalcool, the government sponsored program to produce
ethanol from sugarcane as a substitude for gasoline. 22
Proalcool has been plagued by charges of corruption and
Brazil has remained dependent on oil imports from primarily
Arab countries. 23
In an effort to spur production of petroleum in
1976, the Brazilian government bypassed its national oil
monopoly, Petrobras, by granting "risk contracts" to foreign
oil companies. By 1979, no major discovery had been made
despite the issuance of 29 such contracts. The Videla
government of Argentina has also invited foreign participa-
tion in petroleum exploration to further promote its
national self-sufficiency. 24
Argentina and Brazil have been engaged in joint and
national projects to tap the hydroelectric potential of the
Plata River system. Argentina, much earlier than Brazil,
opted for maximum independence in its nuclear energy program
25

State and private nuclear industry in Argentina can extract
its 54,000 tons of uranium ore relatively cheaply. Latin
America's first nuclear power station, the Atucha reactor,
located in Argentina, came on line with 329 megawatts in
1974.25 while Argentina's National Atomic Energy
Commission has received strong government support for the
creation of an indigenous technology and industry, Brazil's
Atomic Energy Commission has been subject to severe govern-
mental setbacks. Resultant delays in the German designed
nuclear plant, Angra II, now scheduled for completion in the
early 1990s, have been the result of forced budget cuts and
layoffs. The government energy establishment in Brazil
seems to be deeply divided between the development of
nuclear energy and hydroelectric plants. Present emphasis
has shifted toward hydroelectric power in Brazil. Hydro-
electric plants produce more cheaply than nuclear
plants. 26
Compared to Brazil, Argentina has been more immune
to any international energy crisis. Argentina possesses a
lead in nuclear energy development over Brazil, while
Brazil's hydroelectric resources are more highly developed.
Brazil suffers more from petroleum induced balance-of-
payments, drains and greater dependency on Arab oil than
Argentina. Perhaps greater cooperation within the Latin
American family of nations may enable Argentina and Brazil
to obtain more favorable terms for oil importation from
26

Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, or possibly Mexico. Neither
Argentina or Brazil can afford to neglect the development of
alternate resources to the exclusion of others. All
possibilities should be examined and expanded.
2 . Industrial Development
In the early 1970s, 28 percent of Argentina's gross
national product originated in industrial production.
Machinery and vehicle production accounted for 16 percent of
industry, while metal working and chemical produced 14 per-
cent. An export incentive program and bilateral trade
agreements gave strong impetus to the machinery, textile,
leathergoods, transportation, and agricultural machinery
sectors. ^' Industry grew by 7.5 percent in 1974, while
in 1980 the gross product of the industrial sector went down
3.5 percent. It thus dropped to the level of 1973 and
registered a total increase of only 14 percent in the 1970s.
A policy of economic openness and a reduction in the real
exchange rate contributed to the drop in sales of domestic
industrial products in the internal market, and for an
increase in the share of imported goods. The drop expe-
rienced in the physical volume of exports of nontraditional
and traditional products was also due to the deterioration
of the real exchange rate. Additionally, on the supply side
there were restrictions imposed at the level of production
by the contraction of financing capacity. 28
27

All these factors impacted differently on the
various branches of industry, presenting an uneven picture.
The gross product of the textile and clothing industry
dropped approximately 12 percent in 1980 to a level 8
percent lower than recorded as far back as 1970. The
machinery industries experienced sharp drops in production
and sales of machine tools, road-making machinery, motor,
tractors and other equipment. The iron and steel industry
was faced with a critical situation due to both a drop in
domestic demand as a result of indirect substitution of
imported for domestic steel and the surplus supply then
available in the world market. Production of pig iron
dropped by 7 percent; production of rolled products by 14
percent; and steel production by 16 percent. There was a
stagnation of the chemical industry in 1970, with a portion
of basic petrochemical products being channelled towards the
export market. In contrast, the output of the motor vehicle
industry exceeded that of 1979 by over 11 percent, despite
the fact that imports consisted of approximately 18 percent
of the market. Table 2 indicates trends in Argentine
manufacturing production. 29
Argentine industry has suffered from serious weak-
nesses. Steel and petrochemicals have been particularly
vulnerable to shortages of imported raw materials. Produc-
tion of manganese, uranium, and copper expanded in the




ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION
Growth Rates
"





1970 pesos) 26,920 23,985 26,172 25,256 -10.9 9.1 -3.5
Food 6,107 5,783 5,871 5,837 - 5.3 1.5 -0.6
Textiles 3,045 2,613 2,896 2,557 -14.2 10.8 -11.7
Wood 419 414 460 457 - 1.2 11.1 -0.7
Paper 1,249 1,289 1,312 1,208 3.2 1.8 -7.9
Chemicals 3,496 3,218 3,615 3,644 -8.0 12.3 0.8
Non-Metallic
Minerals 1,281 1,286 1,377 1,328 0.4 7.1 -3.6
Basic Metal
Industries 1,344 1,270 1,486 1,343 -5.5 17.0 -9.6
Machinery &
Equipment 8,219 6,552 7,439 7,226 -20.3 13.5 -2.9
Other Indus-
tries 1,760 1,560 1,716 1,656 -11.4 10.0 -3.5
Production of some Important Manufactures
Pig Iron (Thousands
of tons)(b) 1,385 1,820 1,938 1,806 31.4 6.5 -6.8
Steel ( thousands of
tons) 2,684 2,783 3,203 2,687 3.7 15.1 -16.1
Rolled Products (thousands of
tons) 2,798 2,527 3,010 2,593 -9.7 19.1 -13.9
Motor Vehicles (thousands
of tons) 236 180 253 282 -23.6 40.6 11.5
Tractors (thousands of
Units) (c) 22 6 7 3 -72.7 16.7 -57.1
Source : Central Bank of Argentina; Centro de Industriales
Siderugicos; Asociacion de Fabricantes de Automotores;
Asociacion de Fabricantes de Tractores.
(a) Preliminary figures
(b) Including sponge iron
(c) Sales of domestic production on the internal market
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Copper and iron ore must be imported. All imports on
minerals have increased since 1967. Many industries are
fragmented into small, undercapitalized private firms with
obsolete equipment, while state-owned industries in turn
suffer frequently from feather-bedding, massive deficits,
and inefficient operation. Argentina's inherent industrial
potential will continue to be reduced unless an extended
economic recovery can be completed. 3 ^
Brazil has engaged in a game of forced-draft "catch
up" industrialization in which the state plays a predominant
role. Brazil's pattern of state entrepreneurial relations
stressed the private sector pulling its own weight as it
strived to become an industrial power. 31 By 1973,
industry's share of the net domestic product (NDP) had
expanded to 31 percent, or double the contribution of agri-
culture. In the early 1970s manufacturing accounted for 72
percent of the national income generated in the industrial
sector. Consumer hard goods, capital equipment, and chemi-
cal industries were the leaders in industrialization. In
terms of capital equipment, domestic production could supply
more than 70 percent of the fixed investment needs of the
country, including advanced machinery and heavy electrical
equipment. Rapid growth of intermediate goods industries
have in many cases caused demand to outstrip local supply,
particularly in nonferrous metals and iron and steel.
Brazil recently established domestic production capacity in
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such areas as petrochemicals, fertilizer, and copper.
Traditional consumer goods industries have been the slowest
growing industries.-* 2
In 1980, Brazilian production increased by 7.5 per-
cent, a little lower than that for the economy as a whole.
Expansion of manufacturing was promoted principally by the
strong dynamism of the sectors producing consumer durables
(10.7 percent) and to lesser extent the growth of production
of intermediate goods (8.3 percent). Capital goods and non-
durable goods expanded at a considerably lower rate. Table
3 illustrates Brazilian growth rates of manufacturing
production.-* 3
The sectors producing intermediate goods in Brazil
expanded at an average annual rate of almost 9 percent
during 1976-1980. Considerable increases registered in
production of the metals, plastics, rubber, and paper indus-
tries contributed to this trend. The biggest expansion
among the various branches of industry, however, was the
engineering industry, which had grown by over 15 percent in
1980. This allowed Brazil to expand its exports, and at the
same time reduce the volume of imports by 11 percent. The
considerable growth rate in the metals industry has been
triggered by steel production, which rose by over 10 percent
in 1980. Production of steel increased over 100 percent
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the petrochemical industry and continued growth by branches
of industries producing foodstuffs, footwear, and
clothing. 34
Brazilian growth declined in the sectors producing
beverages, tobacco, electrical equipment and transport
equipment. Particularly hard hit has been the transport
equipment industry which decreased from almost 14 percent to
5 percent between 1978 and 1979. The growth rate for 1980
did not even amount to 2 percent. This decline was due both
to a fall in production and a reduction in the growth rate
of the motor vehicle industry. 35
Although Brazil has a long tradition of supporting
free enterprise, the government actively participates in
several industrial and public sectors considered critical
for continued development efforts. From 1970 to 1978 the
Brazilian government increased its role in the steel, min-
ing, petrochemical, and fertilizer industries as private
capital was not meeting the growth needs of the country. By
1977 about 85 of the top 200 companies in Brazil had a sig-
nificant share of government ownership. The role of govern-
ment ownership in industry has been criticized, but it is
unlikely that the government will change its position in the
immediate future. The Brazilian government, like that of
Argentina, perceives its future as depending on increased
development. Brazil's future for industrial expansion of
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the manufacturing sectors appears more promising than
Argentina's. 3 *>
Brazil has shown the capacity for dynamic manufac-
tured export growth and ranks strongly as a newly indus-
trializing country (NIC) . Argentina falls within the NIC
category by virtue of the size of its industrial exports in
the mid1970s, but its political instability and inability to
achieve a consistent rate of progress has hampered its
industrial growth and continued potential as a NIC.
3 . Arms Sales and Development
Latin America has not been a region known for pur-
chasing huge amounts of arms. Only six percent of the arms
imported internationally between 1969 and 1978 were
accounted for by Latin American countries. Latin American
countries buy arms from a diversity of suppliers. The
United States no longer dominates the market as it did prior
to the mid-1960s. Many perceived sources of insecurity
based on local geopolitical factors drive these countries to
acquire armaments. Military and authoritarian control of
government, such as in Argentina and Brazil, contributes an
incentive to arm. Argentina and Brazil have long been
recipients of weapons. They receive imported arms from very
diversified sources. 3 ^
Argentina and Brazil have begun to develop export
arms industries of their own. Brazil had nearly half a
billion dollars in sales to over twenty countries in 1979,
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concentrating largely in light armoured vehicles. 38 The
Brazilian ordnance industry (IMBEL) has plans underway to
produce a 5.6 calibre rifle, which it anticipates supplying
to NATO. •" Brazil sold four hundred Cascovel armoured
personnel carriers to Libya in 1977, and other ground arms
have been sold to Abu Dhabi and other Arab states. Aircraft
have been sold to Chile and Togo.
The budding arms industry is viewed as an important
part of each nation's industrial and technological develop-
ment. Precedence has often been given to production of
second echelon Brazilian-made weapons over purchasing more
advanced arms from abroad. When purchase must be made from
abroad, co-production is sought out with other nations so
that transfer of technology can occur and permit local
production. Such joint ventures have been established with
France, Germany, and Italy. Polish missiles are assembled
in Brazil with a French-German consortium, and the West
German Cobra antitank missile has been locally produced
under license. The airforce possesses Mirage III fighters
and two squadrons of F-5Es, with important components such
as tail units and underwing pylons made in Brazil. Major
efforts have been underway to expand the aircraft industry,
and a majority of Brazil's military aircraft are now manu-
factured in Brazil. The Empresa Brasilura of Aeronautica
has become one of the largest aircraft companies in the
developing world, making a range of planes including the
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Xavante jet fighter-trainer and the Bandeirante light trans-
port. Even with these two aircraft and other products, the
Brazilian aircraft industry is still dependent upon foreign
know-how and technology.^
Argentina's arms industry, the Direcion General de
Frabicaciones Militares, dates back to the Second World War.
Argentina has twelve arms-producing plants scattered around
the country. Argentina produces the Pucora, a twinturboprop
aircraft designed to be particularly effective in counter-
insurgency operations, and the TAM (Tanpue Argentina
Midiano) tank, which was designed with West German assis-
tance. The TAM, claimed to be comparable to the French
AMX-30 or the German Leopard I, is available for export,
although Argentine officials have refused to identify exist-
ing or potential customers. Other arms are produced in its
small but highly diversified arms industry. Some arms have
been purchased abroad, most notably with West Germany. A
contract exists for the production of six submarines and six
destroyers to be assembled in Argentine naval yards. The
economically hard-pressed Argentine government has been
limited on new acquisitions it can afford to purchase.
^
The United States policy under the Carter adminis-
tration to restrict military assistance credits to Argentina
and Brazil raised angry protests and curtailed arms trans-
fers to these two countries. Argentina announced it wanted
no American assistance treaty with the United States. Both
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nations expressed resentment against "moral imperialism" and
the "intolerable interference" in its internal affairs. 4 ^
The Reagan Administration has shown greater flexibility and
asked that the ban in arms sales to Argentina be lifted in
1981.43 Presently, Argentina has expressed interest in
receiving United States reconnaissance aircraft and
antisubmarine weapons for the modernization of its
Navy. 44
Argentina and Brazil have embarked upon creating an
arms manufacturing industry for political and security rea-
sons. By becoming more self-sufficient in arms production
they will both become more independent. 45 Argentina and
Brazil have sought to decrease their dependence on arms from
the United States. The United States lost arms sales as an
instrument of influence and leverage in Latin America when
the human rights standard was applied to American arms
sales. Argentina and Brazil perceived the American policy
as an act of foreign interference in their internal affairs
and an affront to their national dignity. Both Argentina
and Brazil will continue to seek assistance from the Western
World, but both are becoming more self-sufficient and
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Latin Americans first sought to coordinate their foreign
policies to enchance collective security when they estab-
lished the International Union of American Republics in the
nineteenth century. Efforts have continued as a means of
countering dominance by the United States. In 1946, the
Americans resisted proposals to imbue the new United Nations
Security Council with preemptive authority over regional
organizations. It appeared for a time that the intrare-
gional authority might succeed in managing local conflicts
while containing unwanted United Sates interference in the
southern hemisphere, however, the Organization of American
States (OAS) proved a weak instrument for controlling inter-
ference from the superpowers. During the 1960s the OAS, as
a regional authority, was incapable of dealing with the
introduction of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and the 1965
unilateral American intervention into the Dominican
Republic. The OAS became concerned with intraregional
problems and resolution of regional conflicts.
^
Considerable disparities of power exist within the
developing countries of Latin America. Argentina and
Brazil, as regional powers, have a reletively larger stake
in the wider international community for which they fre-
quently need the diplomatic and political support of their
41

regional patrons. Three interrelated problems having poten-
tial impact on the foreign policy decisions and affecting
the security of Latin American countries are: 1) the scope
and intensity of the United States-Soviet rivalry; 2)
foreign intervention in regional conflicts; and 3) external
pressures that limit the freedom to control domestic
affairs.
2
Argentina and Brazil have taken an activist position in
their Latin America foreign policies. Both clearly recog-
nize the serious complexity of foreign policy behaviour on a
regional as well as a global level. Argentina and Brazil
describe themselves as valuing peace and recognizing it as a
prerequisite for prosperity. Both support the principle of
non-intervention, but are not indifferent to the problems in
Central America. As regional powers, Argentina and Brazil
possess strong interests in the southern hemisphere and may
eventually have to respond to the regions' problems or
possibly function as intermediaries.
^
Argentina and Brazil have effectively used a system of
foreign policy that pursues their national interests prima-
rily through binational arrangements. However, they recog-
nize the need to deal with other Third World nations and
work within smaller regions, such as the Plata River
region. 4
Argentina and Brazil have both accepted and endorsed a
policy which recognizes the diverse governments of Latin
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America and emphasizes a willingness to work with them.
Early in the 1970s, Argentina shifted its attention toward a
regional balance of power. The Peronists extended a total
of $1,379 billion in long term credits to other Latin
American countries as a part of an aggressive promotion of
trade and investment. Argentina developed a policy of ideo-
logical pluralism under which she sought friendly relations
regardless of political coloration.
^
Effective diplomatic efforts by the Brazilian government
have neutralized most Spanish American countries concerns
over alleged Brazilian expansionist intentions and achieved
a favorable image and role within Latin America for Brazil.
A priority goal of President Figueiredo upon taking office
in March, 1979, was to declare Latin America the priority
region for national diplomacy. In the first twenty months
of his administration he visited Venezuela, Paraguay,
Argentina, and Chile. Brazilians, during this same time
period, hosted visits by the presidents of Peru, Mexico, and
Argentina. 6
Recent rapproachment between Argentina and Brazil indi-
cates dramatically the change in political climate through-
out Latin America, which has led to a growing feeling of
shared national interests vis-a-vis developing states. ^ a
more interdependent world system has forced Latin America to
reemphasize bloc bargaining with outside powers in order to
overcome extra regionally induced problems. Cultivation of
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regional multilateral diplomacy is important to both
Argentina and Brazil, yet both countries give precedence to
diplomatic efforts.
A. MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS
Multilateral diplomacy in Latin America was in a transi-
tional stage during the 1970s. Older, declining institu-
tions with more restricted memberships were replaced by
newer institutions with broader memberships, though with
still undefined functions and ideological orientations.
This transformation reflected the evolving power balance and
political climate Argentina and Brazil encountered in their
bilateral relationships with Latin America and each other.
°
The transition to new institutions also reflected changing
global economic conditions and the organizational theories
and concepts which were put forth to deal with them.
Economic integration based on the free trade and customs
union models of Western Europe was the strategy developed on
a regional basis. However, nationalism in Latin American
countries combined with the global economic crisis following
the OPEC crisis in 1973 made this concept appear unrealis-
tic. A more interdependent world system has forced Latin
America countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, to consider
the possibilities of regional groups or organizations for
combating problems created by external forces. This makes
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it more difficult for Argentina and Brazil to preserve their
independence .
^
1 . The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
Regional integration was first advanced in the 1950s
as a partial solution for the Latin American shortage of
foreign exchange and its diminished import capacity. It was
thought a large Latin American market "could absorb manufac-
tures produced within the region, and lessen external import
requirements; economies of scale could be realized, and
cooperative decisions among countries for complimentary
investments could assure efficiency of supply." Stagnation
of Latin American exports in the latter 1950s and the suc-
cess of the European Common Market combined to make regional
integration appear both feasible and highly attractive. ^
Latin American integration efforts culminated in 1960 when
the Treaty of Montevideo was signed establishing the Latin
American Free Trade Association. The treaty was signed by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay (later
joned by Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia)
.
Initially, LAFTA showed great promise toward eliminaton of
trade barriers among the countries, but this progress soon
slowed and actual advances were minimal. LAFTA' s poor
performance record can be explained by the shortcomings of
the legal instrument with which the association was founded
and by the lack of political willingness on the part of the
member countries to accelerate the integration process.^
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Argentina and Brazil are members of LAFTA. It was
envisioned that all Latin American countries would benefit
from the larger market and take advantage of economies of
scale, however, both Argentina and Brazil benefited more
substantially than the less developed nations. The
Agreement of Cartagena signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru in May, 1969, established the Andean Pact.
The less developed five Andean nations sought to establish a
subregional integration movement that would enlarge and
strengthen the markets of several of the economically less
advanced countries and be able to compete on a more equal
footing with other member nations of LAFTA. These less
developed nations did not have significant leverage to nego-
tiate unilaterally with the larger, more advanced countries
of Argentina and Brazil. 12
Many reasons have been used to explain the lack of
success in economic integration in Latin America. The dis-
parate size and various levels of economic development of
the Latin American nations were significant obstacles to
economic integration. Regional cooperation was made more
difficult by the changing governments of the member nations
and their different respective economic development poli-
cies.'^ LAFTA was unsuccessful in promoting integration
due to a shift toward development through central or state
planning "rather than reliance on private enterprise or a
more open economic setting, and complete structures of
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industry over a share in a regional market." Additionally,
traditional rivalries and hostilities between members
prevented integration efforts from realizing their full
potential. 1 ^
The larger states, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
remained ambivalent about making economic union their prior-
ity, and each had its own home market to assure at least
moderate rates of growth. Mexico was concerned with opening
up the rich North American market for its own goods. To
Brazil, with its immense home market, national resources,
and Portuguese heritage the southern hemisphere was only a
complement to an ambitious global trade strategy. The idea
of an economic union as a first step toward establishing a
powerful Latin American community had little appeal to
Brazilians. Argentina, on the other hand, feared the com-
petition of cheap labor products from its less developed
neighbors. Furthermore, Argentina's and Brazil's size and
well-developed nationalism meant they had less need for a
united Latin America. 1 ^
Argentina had never really sought economic integra-
tion because it feared Brazilian influence and favored com-
mitment to autonomous industrialization. However, LAFTA
became a vital market for Argentina, providing a multilat-
eral instrument for negotiating with the most important
countries of Latin America and the juridicial framework for
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a whole series of supplementary trades and joint development
arguments. 1
°
Brazil's hopes for LAFTA were modest, yet advantages
were envisioned for itself: a free trade zone to promote
regional trade and a means to avoid application of GATT's
most favored nation requirements to a larger portion of its
South American trade. Brazil assigned LAFTA a low priority
compared to its domestic market, which was retained for
national industry.'
Argentina's and Brazil's role in LAFTA politics was
always influenced by their relative advantages in level of
industrialization and market size. Both countries were
"satisfied" members who were reluctant to grant concessions
to weaker members. Argentina and Brazil were the two
largest and most influential members; between them in 1974
they had 50.5 percent of LAFTA' s intrazonal exports and 45.2
percent of its intrazonal imports.^
LAFTA was on the verge of collapse in 1973. Annual
trade liberalization negotiations based on product-byproduct
tariff concessions had almost ceased completely and most
countries feared competition. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
were unwilling to continue nonreciprocal trade benefits for
the relatively less developed countries. The member states
agreed to hold collective negotiations in December, 1973.
During these talks Argentina, supported by Brazil and
Mexico, attempted to promote renewed trade liberalization
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with provisions for bilateral and subregional arrangements
to accommodate its bilateral economic strategy in Latin
America. The association seemed initially about to reach
preliminary agreement on automatic tariff cuts for those
products the members were willing to place under free trade,
an eventual zonal import substitution policy and retirement
of those tariff concessions which conflicted with the Andean
Group program. However, no substantive arrangements were
ever drafted and by December, 1974, the talks reached a
complete impasse. Additional talks produced no change and
as a result member nations were bound only to reduce their
tariffs toward each other by 2.9 percent annually until
1980. 19
Until 1980, when the Cavacas Protocol expired, LAFTA
shielded Argentina's and Brazil's bilateral arrangements
from GATT's most favored nation clause. When Argentina was
faced with the progressive collapse of LAFTA and new tariffs
on its exports, it cultivated efforts to establish a rela-
tionship with the Andean Group to prevent the freezing of
barriers to Argentine exports. ^0 Brazil, in the other
hand, felt that its own export promotion apparatus and well-
negotiated bilateral treaties with its neighbors would prove
more effective than LAFTA' s multilateral mechanisms. Brazil
was well received by the Andean Pact members and its trade
with them rose gradually in the 1970s. 21
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Argentina and Brazil continued to pay lip service to
LAFTA until its demise in 1980. It was replaced by the
Latin American Integration Association (Asociacion Latino
Americano de Integracion - ALADI) , designed to be more flex-
ible than LAFTA and more capable of dealing with the differ-
ing degrees of economic health and political stability of
its members. It allows members to follow separate paths of
subregional integration, and grants greater leeway regarding
trade concessions as well as assistance to less developed
members. Trade-offs of benefits and conflicts between goods
of regional economic arrangements and interests of member-
states will continue to plague efforts to establish a Latin
American wide economic system. ^2
While Brazil showed only lukewarm support for LAFTA,
it has strongly advocated a reconstruction of continental
economic integration through ALADI. Brazil believes that by
firming up Latin American unity vis-a-vis the industrialized
states through multilateral negotiations, it can in turn
reinvigorate the integration movement, with the Brazilian
economy playing the key role. This would also serve to
advance its own opportunities for trade and investment in
South America and may be viewed by some as a double edged
opportunity for Brazil. 23
2. The Organization of American States (OAS)
After World War II, Americans perceived an expanded
role for themselves internationally and the concept of
50

global responsibility became an assumption of American
foreign policy. This attitude and the United States'
perception of Soviet expansion led the United States to ini-
tiate and join in a number of regional alliances. In the
Rio Treaty of 1947, which gave rise to the Organization of
American States (OAS) , the United States joined with twenty
Central American and South American nations in the formation
of a multilateral pact. It was perceived as an instrument
for prohibiting intervention by foreign states in Latin
American affairs and providing for consultation among the
members with regards to external threat. The Rio Pact can
be considered as an outgrowth of the Monroe Doctrine and an
expression of traditional United States concern about its
own hemisphere. 4
Latin Americans looked to the United States for
security and welfare, however, they continued to be uneasy
about unilateral intervention by the United States within
the southern hemisphere. The United States as a great power
participating in a regional complex plays a strong position,
linking its regional outlook to a more global perspective.
This does not best serve the objectives of the smaller coun-
tries. All the members of the OAS under the Rio Treaty
individually assumed the formal obligation to assist any
member which was a victim of aggression. Realistically,
this policy has not always been perceived to be consistent
with actual world events. 25
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In 1948, the Ninth Pan-American Conference, at
Bogota, established the OAS as a regional grouping under the
United Nations. 26 This diplomatic alliance was formed
to "promote the peaceful settlement of ... international dis-
putes and to encourage .. .international trade" . *7 Soon
after the OAS was formed, a difference emerged between the
priorities of the United States and the Latin American
nations. Whereas the United States interpreted the alliance
as a vehicle to combat Communist aggression in the region,
the Latin American nations were more interested in an
alliance to assist in economic and social development of the
region. The Latin Americans were more committed to
strengthening economic assistance and the promotion of Latin
American integration. ^8
Despite its farsighted and flexible charter and its
sustained effort of cooperation and friendship in the
Americas, the OAS finds its course of action constrained by
the uneven desires of its members. Since the OAS' inception
its members commitment has proved to vascilate between weak
and firm. The underlying commitments are secure, however,
interest in the fortune of the OAS periodically waxes and
wanes among its members. 29
The Rio Treaty has been invoked on some twenty occa-
sions since 1948, to stop actual or threatened hostilities.
Its strength can be attributed to its contribution to
precluding hostilities rather than in resolving underlying
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disputes among OAS members or in restraining domestic
violence and turmoil. The Rio Treaty has benefited smaller
nations as their national sovereignty was to an important
degree preserved against threats both without and within the
region. Other methods used for restraining international
tension and hostility in the region include mediations by
the Holy See in the dispute between Chile and Argentina, the
Inter-American Peace Committee (1948-1966), and the informal
OAS "corridor diplomacy" of the 1970s. Where a consensus
existed among its members, the OAS has shown it can act
effectively. However, when the consensus was shifting, as
in the Malvinas dispute, the organization's effectiveness
has been restricted. 30
The fortunes of the OAS seem to have paralleled the
ebbs and flows of the relationships among the regional coun-
tries. Regional economic objectives and standards, adopted
under the OAS charter reforms in 1967 and made effective in
1970, did little to alter this characteristic. Obligations
to put these reforms into practice remain moral rather than
legal in nature. Most Latin Americans believe that the OAS
should regionally emphasize and coordinate cooperative
developmental efforts. 31
Argentina and Brazil strongly support the OAS, how-
ever, neither country has demonstrated a major commitment to
utilize the organization as a channel for their relations
with one another or other Latin American countries. They
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each contribute a greater percentage toward the OAS' budget
than any other Latin American country with the exception of
Mexico (the United States contributes 66 percent). 32
Argentina acts to preserve its independence and to
pursue enhanced influence, prestige, and specific goals. It
has used the OAS as a forum to manage the Latin American
balance of power, obtain diplomatic support for its claim to
the Malvinas, and to expand its economic opportunities.
Argentina must maintain an effective Latin American "connec-
tion, yet avoid too close an association with excessively
radical positions threatening a confrontation with the
United States". 33
Argentina has been concerned with economic issues
and supports the development of a Latin American community,
which the interAmerican system has to serve. Argentine
policy reflects general Latin American discontent with the
organization's stagnation, concentration on politics and
security matters to the neglect of economic questions, as
well as long-standing dislike of United States domina-
tion. 34 Argentina's Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion in
a speech to the Ninth OAS General Assembly in December,
1981, stressed the use of horizontal cooperation to be used
as a tool for promoting economic recovery of the Latin
American countries. He requested that a special meeting be
held to discuss continental development so as to strengthen
freedom, democracy, justice and well-being in all Latin
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American countries. In addition, he pointed out that no
real progress had been achieved along paths deemed appro-
priate for attaining continental solidarity nor had efforts
been made toward defending principles which had given rise
to the formation of the OAS. 5
The OAS does not figure into Brazilian diplimatic
calculations to the extent that it does in those of the
smaller members. Brazil's activity has not been limited to
Latin America and it has acquired a considerable degree of
autonomy in its foreign relations. It is not necessary for
Brazil to rely on force of numbers to face the United
States. Brazil has chosen the option of assuming a rather
low profile role in the OAS. Brazil doubts somewhat how
much the OAS can accomplish, especially in relationships
between Latin American countries and the United States, how-
ever, this does not imply lack of interest in the organiza-
tion. Brazil utilizes the OAS for a number of functions
relevant to its foreign policy and as an adjunct to its
bilateral efforts. Brazil supports the interAmerican system
as an appropriate forum for regional problems. The OAS
provides Brazil with a channel for dialogue opportunities,
but does not constitute a major podium.
Brazil has used collective pressure available in the
OAS to encourage policy changes in other governments on
issues such as the United States, trade, protectionism,
territorial waters, and political terrorism. Brazil has
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been careful not to allow its close relationship with the
United States to isolate it from the rest of Latin
America. •*» Brazil has consistently refused to go along
with the idea of establishing an OAS for "Latins" and seems
more comfortable with the weight of the United States role
in the OAS than many other Latin American countries. 37
Argentina and Brazil will continue to support the
principles of the OAS, while attempting to use the organiza-
tion as a platform for their own national interests and
pursuit of independent foreign policy goals. The OAS
supplements both nation's bilateral relations. On the
regional level, Argentina has some hope for a direct impact
and autonomous action, but on the global level it is. one of
many middle powers. Brazil, on the other hand, has become
more engaged in the global system and its multilateral rela-
tionships in Latin America will be influenced primarily by
its extra hemispheric interests. In a more interdependent
world system, the small nations of Latin America could use
the OAS as a tool for bloc bargaining with outside powers.
The Rio Treaty should be revised to increase its effective-
ness as an instrument of collective security and redefine
its role in Latin American affairs. Argentina and Brazil as
regional powers could help make this effective if they were
willing to make the commitment. Additionally, the United
States would have to be willing to assume more of a
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back-seat position in the OAS and not overshadow the opin-
ions of smaller Latin America countries.
3 . The River Plata Basin Group
In April 1969, five countries signed the Plata Basin
Treaty pledging their support to create the necessary legal
arrangements for improvement of navigation, use of hydraulic
resources, conservation, and the development of industry and
physical infrastructure. The treaty contained no binding
obligations and Article 4 required that all multilateral
efforts would be "without prejudice to such projects or
enterprises that they [the signatories] decide to execute
within their respective territories, with due respect to
international law and good practice among neighborly and
friendly nations". 38
The Twelfth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the
countries of the La Plata River Basin was held November,
1981, at Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. Real progress
was made in achieving joint integration efforts. The meet-
ing specified the need to examine the feasibility of
regional and subregional projects. The principle of promot-
ing "harmonious and balanced development" among member
nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
incorporated into the treaty of 1969, has often been marred
by heated discussion and interpretation. The concept has
never been accepted enough to bring about reconciliation
between the wishes of some countries and the cooperation
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required of others. In the final analysis, Argentina and
Brazil need to be the ones to provide the resources for
carrying out any group initiative. At this meeting,
Argentina and Brazil appeared as the natural moderators for
the proposals of the others. Attention was focused on a
general examination of the La Plata River Basin matters at
hand and not distracted by disputes over each country's
unilateral concept for exploiting the upper Paranas
River. 39
Argentina and Brazil finally stopped adding to the
mass of reports and resolutions which ended up as dead
letters during previous meetings of the foreign ministers of
the Basin. The Argentine foreign minister stated that they
should not add to the list of projects nor enlarge them out
of "obstinacy" but rather "establish priorities so as to use
effectively the resources available, which by definition are
limited". 40
Energy development of the vast River Plata Basin was
previously marred by bilateral competition between Argentina
and Brazil. The area equivalent to one-sixth of Latin
America and approximately equal to one-third of Europe,
includes portions of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay,
and Uruguay. The immense potential for hydroelectric devel-
opment is currently being developed by a series of dams.
Upon completion, Brazil's giant Itaipu will be the largest
dam in the world. The dispute between Argentina and Brazil
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revolved around the possible impact the Itaipu project would
have on the Corpus project, Argentina's smaller facility-
being constructed 200 miles south on the Parana River.
Argentina took the position that Itaipu would alter the
navigability of the Argentina portion of Parana River and
adversely affect the generating capacity of Corpus. The
conflict was further complicated by the presence of
Paraguay, who has been cooperating with both Argentina for
the building of Corpus and with Brazil for the Itaipu. 41
The long and often bitter dispute seemed near reso-
lution in early 1978, when Brazil agreed to reduce Itaipu'
s
water drop height in an amount that would permit Corpus to
be appropriately raised. . Another side issue posing some
trouble seemed partially resolved when Brazil proposed to
install half of Itaipu' s generators at the Paraguayan (and
Argentine) standard of fifty cycles and the other half at
the Brazilian sixty-cycle standard. Paraguay complicated
matters by refusing this Brazilian proposal. This and other
issues were then taken up on tripartite negotiations. 4 ^
Many other minor issues of conflict occurred among
the member nations, such as Bolivia's interest in a plan to
interconnect the basins of the Orinoco, Amazon and Plata
River. This proposal was supported by Argentina. Brazil
maintained that the project was of low priority overall,
extremely expensive and its economic outcome doubtful. The
confrontation over the Plata River Basin clearly
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demonstrates the entire background of South American inte-
gration attempts and the conflicts that are generated
despite cooperative efforts between nations. *
The solution to the regional development of the
Plata Basin was a prerequisite for Argentine-Brazilian co-
operative efforts in other areas. The gradual strengthening
of regional machinery for development helped create a grow-
ing web of interrelationships between the two nations. Dr.
Gonzolo Romero, the Bolivian foreign minister commented that
the Twelfth Conference of Foreign Ministers marked a trend
toward cooperation of the Basin Treaty. He stressed that
this kind of meeting makes it possible to get to know each
other better and enables identification of problems
requiring resolution through common efforts. 44
The recent cooperation between Argentina and Brazil
appears to be in marked contrast to their traditional
rivalry. This cooperative spirit was first embodied in the
Plata Basin Group, a regional organization. This group has
made considerable progress in coordinating ongoing national
programs and stimulating new efforts. It was also a begin-
ning for further cooperative efforts between Argentina and
Brazil.
B. BILATERAL RELATIONS
Smaller countries in Latin America have more bargaining
leverage dealing through regional blocs or multilateral
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organizations. Argentina has the option of using bilateral
and multilateral diplomacy, or both. Argentina and Brazil
prefer bilateral diplomatic efforts to pursue their national
interests. Both nations can be expected to pay lip service
to Latin American integration efforts and play a construc-
tive role in multilateral projects, but will push their
continental policies mainly bilaterally.
1 . Changing Perceptions in Regional Rivalries
An analysis of regional policies by Latin American
government shows the development of new forms of cooperation
within the region which are superimposed on persistent pat-
terns of conflict and hostility.^ Military security
threats in Latin America usually come from a nation's imme-
diate neighbors or at least its local neighborhood. There
are many serious conflicts plaguing small states in South
America and the Caribbean region. The rivalry of regional
powers, such as Argentina and Brazil, presents another type
of threat to small buffer states like Uruguay, Paraguay and
Bolivia.
Argentina and Brazil have traditionally competed for
dominant influence in these neighboring countries. Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Bolivia emerged as buffer states or neutral
zones. Today, these three countries are linked to Buenos
Aires and Brazilia via transportation patterns,
communication systems, development projects, trade and
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investments. Buffer states must strive to maintain cordial
relations with both Argentina and Brazil because their
physical and economy security depends on it. 4 **
Argentina does not regard its frontiers as secure
despite unbroken peace since the War of the Triple Alliance
with Paraguay in the 1860s. The river boundary with Uruguay
was finally settled in 1973 and demarcation of a portion of
the Beagle Channel is still pending with Chile. 47
Argentina's military is constantly on the offensive in bor-
dering states. Argentina security forces in the summer of
1980 particpated in a Bolivian coup which prevented the
popularly elected president, leftist Siles Zuazo, from
.assuming office. This intervention was called "intervention
by consent", or "by invitation" ,°
Political stability and economic growth in South
America and the absence of acute local disputes are benefi-
cial for Brazil's prosperity and enhanced world role.
Brazilian diplomacy has effectively used tension management
in its sparsely settled border areas with Argentina,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Guyana. Brazil has begun
to establish a "security perimeter" in neighboring areas,
assuring itself friendly neighbors without complete
domination of them. 4 ^
Argentina and Brazil individually have participated
in joint ventures with their neighbors. The giant Itaipu
dam complex on the Paraguayan frontier marked a joint
62

Brazilian-Paraguayan effort that will make electricity
Paraguay's most important export and provide Brazil with an
important needed source of energy. Brazil has also nego-
tiated with Bolivia for oil and natural gas supplies. ^^
Argentina has signed cooperation agreements, which include
technical assistance with Peru, Paraguay, and Bolivia.
Argentina has provided military training for officers from
many neighboring countries. 51 Peru and Argentina signed
a nuclear transfer agreement in 1979, and major cooperation
agreements in the nuclear field have been concluded with
Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and
Venezuela. ^2
Traditionally Brazil and Venezuela have maintained a
cool relationship and their interests have conflicted on
several fronts. The importance of democratic government and
human rights, the price and supply of oil, nuclear prolifer-
ation, and the new international order are a few of the
areas their views have differed on." Brazil's 1976
Amazon Pact initiative began to slowly diffuse mistrust in
Caracas toward Brazil and clear evidence of political liber-
alization in Brazil furthered the progress. Brazilian
Foreign Minister, Saraiva Guerreiro's visit to Caracas in
1979 led to broad understanding in trade, joint ventures,
and technical cooperation between the two nations.
The Amazon Pact provided Brazil with a useful
instrument for conveying a cooperative image to the Andean
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countries and further alleviating alleged Spanish American
concern over Brazilian expansionism. Brazil's effective
diplomatic skills and its own greater experience in
Amazonian settlement capitalized on the Andean nations'
interest in the Amazon by putting forth both bilateral and
multilateral cooperative efforts. In the process, Brazil
worked out bilateral trade, joint ventures, and other agree-
ments which proved attractive enough to take Peru off the
defensive. Andean Pact members viewed Brazil's breaking off
diplomatic relations with the Somoza government of Nicaragua
in its final weeks as supportive of their active diplomacy
in the crisis. In 1980, a consultative machanism was estab-
lished with the Pact to provide for future cooperation and
which acted as a statement in support of international
economic reform. ^4
Brazil in the last decade has effectively and peace-
fully consolidated its status as the principle and most
influential nation among its neighbors in South America.
Central America and the Caribbean have not normally been
placed high on the list of Brazil's diplomatic concerns,
although some ministerial visits took place during the first
two years of the Figueiredo government. Brazil has followed
a policy of staying as noncommittal as possible regarding
revolutionary movements in the region. Brazil has made
several attempts to deepen relations with Mexico, though
presidential visits and package agreements have produced
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little concrete progress. Relations with Cuba still remain
cool. 55
Existence of increasingly activist regional foreign
policies of the Latin American powers necessitates a recog-
nition of the complexity of foreign policy behavior on a
regional as well a global level. Pursuit of domestic goals
reflecting national strategic and economic objectives effect
not only regional, but global policy formation. Patterns of
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil illustrate changes
occurring in bilateral relationships as the result of devel-
opments in the domestic political situations of both coun-
tries as well as the impact of international pressures. New
forms of cooperation within the region have developed which
are superimposed on persistent patterns of conflict and
hostility. Regional competition will continue to exist
between Argentina and Brazil, but future Brazilian influence
will surpass Argentine influence in the neighboring states.
Greater cooperation between Argentina and Brazil could
provide the impetus needed for greater South American
integration and economic development. Additionally,
Argentine and Brazilian cooperation can be viewed as a
regional counterweight to United States influence in the
southern hemisphere.
2. Beagle Islands Dispute (Chile vs Argentina)
Argentina and Chile have been priming for war over
islands in the Beatle Channel for a long time. The
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underlying sources of this dispute, which have been sub-
jected to international mediation, relate to mineral and
fishing rights, off-shore oil and portions of the
Antarctica. It led each country to spend over $1 billion a
piece for new ships and weapons in the late 1970s and to the
deployment of forces along their borders. 56
The Treaty of 1881 provided that the boundary lines
in Tierra del Fuego would proceed until it "touched the
Beagle Channel". Initially Argentila tried to establish the
boundary in the channel itself, but this claim failed.
Argentina then attempted to prove that the Beagle Channel
was really located south of the islands of Picton, Nevva,
and Lennox, which would have given it control of the
islands. However, the islands have been occupied and
governed by Chile since before the turn of the century.
This gives Chile effective control of the channel and the
approaches to the Argentina naval base located at Ushuaia.
The matter was placed in arbitration in 1971 after repeated
incidents and protests between Argentina and Chile. In May,
1977, under Britain's arbitration a new boundary line was
drawn in the center of the Beagle Channel. Chile was
awarded the three disputed islands, but Argentina received
clear title to a navigable channel to the port of Ushuaia.
Chile accepted the mediation, Argentina refused and declared
the award "null". After Argentine attempts to achieve its
goals through bilateral negotiations failed, it mobilized
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reserves, deployed forces to the border and threatened war.
Chile resisted Argentine threats and prepared its own
defenses. Towards the end of 1978, a truce was achieved at
the very brink of war between Argentina and Chile. ^7
While the reasons for the crisis are both strategic
and economic, the principle issues between Argentina and
Chile are "(1) the ownership of the islands, (2) maritime
limits that island ownership affects, (3) navigational
rights in the Magellan Straits, (4) exploitation of the sea,
including subsoil hydrocarbon deposits, and (5) territorial
claims in the Antartic. "" The dispute centers over con-
trol and sovereignty over maritime space and the idea of
maritime space being treated as territory of a country.
Under the 1977 arbitration, Chile claimed that the award,
together with the 200-mile limit, give it control of mari-
time space, which according to Argentina not only deprives
Argentina of the economic use of this portion of the sea,
but also cuts across communication lines to its Antartic
claim and bases therein. Additional actions taken by Chile
involving acts of sovereignty aroused violent protest and
reaction in Argentina. Chile established the so-called
lineas de base rectas, which enclosed the islands confirmed
by the award and constructed a basis for extending the




The Argentineans have always feared strategic
"encirclement" by Brazil and Chile, both on land and sea.
To prevent a maritime linkage between Brazil and Chile,
Argentina strives to confine Chile to the Pacific, and to
exercise control of the Drake Passage from bases in the
south of the continent and in its Antarctic claim. This
same concept accounts for Argentina's effort to recover the
Malvinas Islands, for bases in these strategic islands could
ensure control of both the Strait of Magellan and the Drake
Passage. Argentina argues in terms of sovereignty over
essential maritime space in reaction to Chilean acts of
sovereignty in the disputed area. President Pinochit of
Chile noted that the principle divergence between Argentina
and Chile resulted from "the necessity to delimit the mari-
time jurisdiction of our states in the southeastern zone of
the continent" and emphasized "that these areas, although
covered with water, are a prolongation of this territory
beneath the sea." 60
Both Argentina and Chile agreed to accept Papal me-
diation over the disputed three islands in the Beagle
Channel by signing an agreement in Montevideo in early
January, 1979. 6 ^ The Pope's proposals on the issue were
formally made on 12 December, 1980, but never pub-






As of early 1979, the Argentine government willingly
approved a motion to accept an adverse verdict on the owner-
ship of the islands on the condition that the off-shore
waters on the Atlantic side are accepted as Argentine by a
special protocol. This position was not necessarily favor-
able to Chile or acceptable to them. The Chilean Ambassador
to Argentina, Sergio Orotre Jorpas Reyes, declared that
"Chile needs an outlet to the Atlantic in order to trade
with Africa" and that "the concept of the absolute division
of the oceans has evolved a great deal."" 4
As a whole, the Argentine military has been unable
to swallow the Vatican proposals. The military wants the
frontier between the two countries to have a "base on terra
firma" at Cape Horn and that in awarding the disputed
islands to Chile too much of the surrounding waters are
given away. Additionally, they object that the so-called
'sea of peace 1 , which is a proposed demilitarized zone
covered by special cooperation treaties, is located only in
the Atlantic without any counterpart on the Pacific. The
Argentine government has internally been unable to resolve
these objections and has pursued no definite policy
regarding the Vatican proposals, other than to stall.
The government of Argentina has been aware that in
1979 it agreed to accept Papal mediation and that any use of
force to recapture the disputed territory after the
Falklands War would be a suicidal proposal in political
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terms. The military junta appears willing to let the deci-
sion to accept the Vatican proposals pass on to the next
civilian government. Argentine politicians fear that if the
next civilian government accepts the Vatican proposals, the
armed forces may rise up in fury over the damage to national
sovereignty and use the issue to prepare yet another
military coup.^ 5
When Argentina's newly elected civilian government
takes over in January, 1984, it will have to deal with the
issue of accepting the Vatican's mediation over the Beagle
Channel dispute with Chile. There will likely be some hard
questioning of the exact terms of the Pope's proposals but
speedy progress towards an agreement is necessary. Realis-
tic deduction concludes that to end the dispute peacefully,
the Vatican is just about the only route left. The new
civilian government must search for the best possible result
within the Vatican framework.
3 . Regional Effect of the Falklands War
The Argentineans have long felt that Britain
acquired this distant territory on their continental shelf
by force in an era of colonial expansion. British public
and political opinion had persistently underrated the
strength of feeling in Argentina about the Falklands. The
British did not believe that Argentina would seek to take by
force what had been denied to them by negotiation. The
Argentineans, on the other hand, misjudged that the British
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would not react in turn with force and that America would
not support Argentina. As a result of the defeat in the
Falklands War some 1,000 Argentinean men died. 66
In 1965, Argentina registered at the United Nations
its desire to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty for the
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The United Nations instructed
both sides to begin talks, which were conducted roughly once
a year. Each round of talks was usually preceded by fierce
sabre-rattling in Buenos Aires, including threats of inva-
sion. Military action was suppressed by the promise of suc-
cessive negotiations until Argentina took action by force
and invaded the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982. The
islands have since been defended by more than a token force
of British Marines. 67
Specific actions taken by the British government
were made to encourage Argentina to pursue a negotiated
settlement. Almost every British minister which Argentina
dwelt with came to recognize at least the de facto force of
Argentina's claim. The first Wilson government refused to
deny the claim and the Health government signed a communica-
tions agreement with Buenos Aires which effectively ensured
Argentine control over air access to the islands. The
Argentineans extended the Stanley airstrip, ran the islands'
oil supplies and thus developed psychological links with the
mainland meant to overcome the islanders' determination to
remain British. Falklanders themselves made increasing use
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of Argentine schools and hospitals. Both sides assumed that
a mechanism eventually would be found to formalize these
links allowing Argentina to claim "recovery of sovereignty,
while Britain protected the rights and lifestyles of the
inhabitants." 68
The British have always stressed that the principle
of self-determination be given to the islanders. The
Argentineans have always insisted that the islanders' inter-
ests of necessity lie with the nearest mainland. After the
islands were captured by Argentina, the United Nations
Security Council voted by 10-1 that Argentina should with-
draw from the islands. The United States voted in favor and
the Soviet Union abstained. Argentina felt isolated when
the Third World did not applaud its attempt to overcome
colonialism, and even Latin American nations refused to
endorse Argentina. The United States would not rush to
defend Argentina if the Falklands were attacked by the
British. The British launched their fleet, imposed a block-
ade around the islands and persuaded the European Economic
Community (EEC) to impose trade sanctions against Argentina.
In Buenos Aires, Mr. Haig was told: "We have only taken
back what is ours, peacefully, after 150 years of British
rule." 69
In Latin America, the great majority of countries
publicly stated their support of Argentina's claim to the
Falkland Islands, as they often had in the past. However,
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they did totally support Argentina's methods for enforcing
it. 70 The Argentine foreign minister requested a spe-
cial meeting under the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, or Rio Pact, on April 23, 1982. Argentina won
support for the calling of a special meeting to be held at
the OAS. Argentina, perceiving the mood of most Latin
American countries, simply asked for the British forces to
leave the interAmerican defense zone and that sanctions be
lifted by the Europeans. 71 It is interesting to note
that before it signed the Rio treaty years ago, Argentina
noted its claim to the Falklands, South Georgia, and the
Sandwich Islands, but Americans claimed at the time that the
treaty had no bearing on sovereignty. 72
The final resolution of the OAS, on April 28, 1982,
recognized Argentina's claims to sovereignty, but called for
a truce and settlement which would take the wishes of the
islanders into account. Brazil told Argentina that it could
expect no military aid, but the British recapture of South
Georgia and subsequent events brought a change of mood in
Brazil. Brazil then agreed to supply Argentina with recon-
naissance aircraft. Brazil has a strong interest in pre-
serving regional stability and in maintenance of political
stability in Argentina. 7 -^ Throughout most of this
crisis, the Brazilians sought to preserve their neutrality
and they tactfully offered to represent Argentine interests
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in Britain after the closure of Argentina's embassy in
London. 7 ^
Venezuela gave Argentina strong backing during the
Falkland Islands War. Venezuela has quarrels with ex-
British Guyana and disapproves of the big-power veto in the
United Nations Security Council. Bolivia offered Argentina
military aid. Panama supported Argentine claims to sover-
eignty and the Guatemalan delegate to the OAS meeting spoke
of the "fictitious independence" of Belize, a formerly
British country, it has its eye on. Peru called for an
international solution to the problem. 7 ^ Chile closed
its border with Argentina during the crisis, however,
officially the Chilean government merely disapproved of
Argentina's seizure by force of the islands. Chile fears
that Argentina may someday invade the three islands involved
in the Beagle Channel dispute. Mexico quietly disapproved
of Argentina's grabbing of the islands. Mexico, like many
Latin Americans, feels that Argentina may have set" a
precedence for using force in other regional territorial
claims. Ecuador, Colombia, and Costa Rica offered their
service through the OAS as mediators. Paraguay and Uruguay
offered unequivocal support to their southern neighbor.
There was little backing for Argentina in the
English-speaking Caribbean. 76
The American delegate to the OAS, Mr. William
Middendorf, felt that it was inappropriate for Argentina's
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request to invoke provisions of the Rio Treaty and that the
OAS was the incorrect forum. The Latin American signatories
to the treaty were hard pressed to agree with the sentiment
as the United States had so often used the organization as a
forum for its own complaints against Cuba and more recently
Nicaragua. The United States had a weak contention thatr
Argentina was misusing the OAS as an arena for settlement of
the issue. 77
Successive governments have indoctrinated the
Argentineans with the idea that the Malvinas are theirs as
an undisputed right. Even after the defeat at Port Stanley,
Argentine sentiment indicated that it would never give up
its struggle to obtain sovereignty over the Falklands. 7 ^
At the conclusion of the Falklands War, one Argentine
politician commented:
We are witnessing the end of another military regime,
the sixth since the process began in 1930. And like all
the military regimes that promised a solution, it has
wound up by seeking a way out.
These words do not totally capture the discouragement and
frustration that gripped many Argentineans in the aftermath
of military defeat, profound economic deterioration, and
politican uncertainties. Whether the military government
would be able to bring off free elections as it promised in
1984 was uncertain. 7 ^
After the War, Argentina again moved to schedule
talks with Britain. The United States and the Latin
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countries supported Argentina in its call for negotiations
in the United Nations on the status of the islands.
Although Argentineans knew that Great Britain was their
enemy during the war, some felt far more anger and bitter-
ness toward the United States. Latin Americans prize
loyalty much more deeply than North Americans seem to and
they deeply resented the fact that the United States did not
maintain a stance of neutrality and provided aid to the
enemy when war finally came. Argentine leaders said that
United States support for Britain might force them to turn
toward the Soviet Union or Cuba for aid, but no such align-
ment took place. Argentina has remained firmly a Western
nation. 80
"The shock waves from the Falklands (Malvinas) jolt
to United States-Latin American relations continue to
reverberate throughout the hemisphere, and only time will
tell the extent of the damage." Latin American resentment
has taken largely symbolic gestures like the recent election
of Nicaragua to a United Nations Security Council seat, the
spokesmanship of the Latin American group in the World Bank,
and talk of establishing an OAS for "Latins only". 81
The struggle against a major European power made
Argentineans acutely aware of the need for hemispheric
solidarity (already a traditional thrust of its foreign
policy) and sharpened its appreciation of what it means to
be a Third World nation. 82
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Politically the war brought in a new president and
civilian politicians demanded a return to civilian rule.
Additionally, the war caused lasting splits within the mili-
tary establishment itself. The newly elected administration
when it comes to power in January, 1984 will have to contend
with many fundamental conflicts that defeat in the war only
sharpened. It will be difficult for the new civilian
government in Argentina to survive if it cannot get the
British to the negotiating table. Latin American needs a
politically stable Argentina.
C. BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE RELATIONS
Argentina and Brazilian foreign policy has been charac-
terized by ambivalence as a result of the tendency to iden-
tify with Europe and the United States, while attempting to
exert leadership or influence over South America. Past
rivalry between the two giants of South America has been
intense, especially in regards to the River Plata Basin.
Territorial conflicts in that area were initially instigated
by Spain and Portugal. Paraguay achieved its political
independence in 1811 by its ability to play off one of its
large neighbors against the other. Uruguay, a buffer state,
has maintained independence since its creation in 1838 by




Great Britain maintained influence over both Argentina
and Brazil during the nineteenth century. Both countries
experienced a large influx of European immigrants and each
increased its power position vis-a-vis the other South
American nations. Argentina achieved this through economic
advances, while Brazil increased its power through the
expansion of its territory at the expense of each of its
contiguous neighbors. 8 ^
As the twentieth century emerged the international rela-
tionships of the two countries diverged. Brazil assumed a
role of intermediary between the United - States and the other
Latin American states. Argentine leaders resented what they
viewed as United States favoritism toward Brazil, and con-
sequently chose not to compete with Brazil for the favor of
the United States. Argentina advocated a policy of Latin
Americanism and universalism as opposed to Pan Americanism.
Argentina maintained closer ties with Europe. 8 ^
Argentina maintained a neutral stance during World War
I, while Brazil declared war against the central powers.
During World War II, Argentina maintained what the United
States considered a "pro-Axis Neutrality" while Brazil con-
tributed bases and troops to the allied support. During the
1950s, however, both countries were under the prevailing
influence of the United States. 86
In 1961, Presidents Frondizi of Argentina and Janio
Quadros of Brazil stated they would coordinate their
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policies vis-a-vis the United States, the socialist coun-
tries, and the Third World in defense of their democracy and
civil liberties and to enhance their independence from the
United States. The military establishments in a coup d'etat
in Argentina in 1962 and Brazil in 1964 reversed these
tendencies. By 1965, the military leaders of Argentina and
Brazil established an accord that provided for cooperative
efforts in counter insurgency operations. The two countries
worked closely together, in conjunction with Uruguay,
Paraguay and Bolivia, to eliminate insurgent movements which
they assumed to be operating across national frontiers. 8 ^
The two countries competed for public and private capi-
tal from the United States and for the favor of inter-
national lending agencies. During the 1973 elections in
Argentina, Peron proposed a foreign policy of
"continentalism" , and accused Brazil of being an agent of
the United States. Despite all this rhetoric, Argentina
continued to approach Brazil on a basis of accommodation
rather than of confrontation. 88
Points of disagreement and concurrence characterized
Argentine-Brazilian relations in the 1970s. The spectacular
development of Brazil and the process of integration of the
La Plata Basin produced friction in their bilateral rela-
tions. Fishing incidents taking place within the Argentine
200-mile limit and bitter negotiations aimed at reconciling
their differences on the big dams at Corpus and Itaipa were
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finally resolved. Additionally, denunciations of "dumping"
and threats of reprisals against subsidized exports of
Brazilian products to the Argentina market were finally
resolved by the zigzagging of currencies.^ 9
Argentine-Brazilian rivalry over the controversial issue
of the use of international waterways formed part of the
Plata Basin integration process. The object of that inte-
gration process has finally achieved harmony within a geo-
graphic and political system that encompasses five countries
in the region and where success rests on the close coopera-
tion that developed over the issue between the two largest
countries, Argentina and Brazil. This cooperation signalled
success for future cooperative efforts between them. 9 ^
Competition in the field of international trade
relations has been present for many years between Argentina
and Brazil. Each country must stretch its resources to the
utmost in order to gain markets in the South-South direc-
tion. Brazil's advance has been exceptional and Brazil's
exports to Latin America have surpassed in value those to
the United States, traditionally Brazil's best commercial
customer. Brazil has absorbed much of Argentina's export of
beef to the European Economic Community (EEC) .^ During
1980, Argentina lost 35 percent of its volume of corned beef
exported to the United States, while Brazil increased its
exports to that market by 61 percent. Meatpacking plant
owners from Argentina and Brazil met to discuss their
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different export policies and jointly agreed to stimulate
consumer markets for corned beef. This type of cooperative
effort would not have occurred ten years ago, but recently
has been encouraged by both governments. ^2
President Joao Figueiredo' s visit to Buenos Aires in
May, 1980, marked the first time a Brazilian president had
visited Argentina in forty-five years. Ten agreements were
signed at that time which provided for cooperation between
Argentine and Brazilian hydroelectric utilization, science
and technology, political consultations, coordination of
grain exports, nuclear energy, and military equipment manu-
factures, among other sectors. Both parties took pains to
disavow hegemonic intentions in South America. ^3
Figueiredo also visited Chile as a counterbalance in
1980. On this visit Brazilian officials were careful to
avoid anything that could be considered as interference in
the internal political process of the host nation.
Brazilian officials also had no desire to become involved in
the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile.
Brazil has shown little interest in Argentina's proposal for
a southern zone security organization and views it as incom-
patible with its political goals. While on his trip to
Chile, Figueiredo stressed the need for peaceful coexistence
and developmental cooperation.^
In 1981 an important seminar organized by the Argentine
Council for International Relations was held in Buenos Aires
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to discuss relations between Argentina and Brazil during the
decade of the 1980s. The Brazilian minister of foreign
relations, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, upon completion of
the meeting spoke of the importance given to Argentina in
formulation of Brazilian foreign policy. He further empha-
sized: "that Brazilian foreign policy is not based on the
presumption of mutually exclusive options or roads leading
in just one direction..." Brazil has recognized by implica-
tion that it is not yet a part of the First World and that
it must preserve ties that can be mutually benef icial .95
More recently, the interchange between Argentina and
Brazil was strengthened by joint naval manuevers called
"Fraterno", which occurred in early 1982. For a long time
Argentina has shown an interest in the Antarctic; Brazil
only more recently. The military ministers of both coun-
tries have characterized development of joint cooperation
efforts as extremely feasible. There has been some concern
in Argentine naval circles, who welcome the joint venture
but are suspicious of Brazil's true interests. 9°
Argentina and Brazil have been able to overcome part of
their historical rivalry in Latin America in order to
further their own national interests. Both Argentina and
Brazil realistically and objectively acknowledge the bene-
fits to be gained from political and economic cooperation.
Brazil has surpassed Argentina as the strongest power in
Latin America, but both as regional powers can use their
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cooperative relationship to strengthen the position of other
Latin American nations. If this line of reasoning were put
into effect it would have dramatic ramifications, but both
Argentina and Brazil will be looking out for themselves
first. Their individual pursuit of independent foreign
policies has led them to cooperative endeavors between them-
selves, but regional benefits derived from this relationship
will be a sidelight to their individual pursuit of their
national interests.
1 . Argentine-Brazilian Convergence over Nuclear Issues
Argentina and Brazil have refused to sign or ratify
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and base their
refusal on similar grounds. Argentina, during a 1968 United
Nations debate on the then proposed NPT, stated that
Argentina:
...cannot accept remaining subordinate to a continuing
dependence on the great powers nuclear technology for
peaceful ends, especially when our country has laid the
foundations for a nuclear technology need for economic
development .^
'
The Argentine delegate coined the phrase that NPT would
"disarm one unarmed", while at the same time impose no re-
strictions on the superpowers' arms race. The Brazilians
have seen the NPT as an attempt to "freeze" the inter-
national power structure in an attempt to contain emerging
powers such as Brazil. 98
Argentina and Brazil have each spearheaded nuclear
development in Latin America and are nearing a technical
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capability which could develop a nuclear explosive device in
the 1980s. They both have similar concerns for energy secu-
rity, but Brazil's heavier burden of imported oil enhances
nuclear power's attraction. For both Argentina and Brazil
nuclear power brings prestige. ^9
Regionally, Argentina and Brazil signed the
Tlatelolco Treaty, which establishes a Latin American
nuclear weapons free zone. Both Argentina and Brazil view
detonation of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosive (PNE) as legiti-
mate under the provisions of this treaty. India's example
of development and testing of PNE's has provided an attrac-
tive model for Argentina and Brazil. Its military applica-
tion has definite importance to certain sectors within
Argentina and Brazil. Both these nations are presently
working on their own approaches to full mastery of the
nuclear fuel cycle and thereby ultimately establishing
independence of action. '^^
Until fairly recently, the United States experienced
close nuclear cooperation with both Argentina and Brazil.
The United States is no longer a principle supplier to
either nation and its ability to influence their nuclear
programs has been significantly diminished because of this.
Both Argentina and Brazil have been pursuing independent
nuclear policy programs.
When Argentine President Juan Peron announced an
ambitious nuclear program, Brazilian uneasiness grew with
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regards to Argentine strategic objectives. The Argentine
program led to the building of a research program in 19 58,
which was followed by power reactor development in the 1960s
and 1970s. Argentina pursued a more independent foreign
policy line than Brazil, who turned to an American-sponsored
nuclear strategy under the Atoms for Peace Program. Table 4
compares the original Argentine and Brazilian plans. From
1960 to 1964, Brazil began to move away from involvement
with the United States and sought to diversify its techno-
logical dependence. Brazil set up limited cooperative
agreements with Canada, France, and West Germany between
1967 and 1972. Brazilian nuclear policy received renewed
impetus during the energy crisis of 1973, which dramatically
underscored the vulnerability of Brazil's dependency on
foreign energy sources. Brazil's 1980 oil bill represented
54 percent of the country's export earning. ^^
Brazil has sought European cooperation for its
nuclear development, making it less dependent on United
States nuclear policy. Brazil signed a major nuclear agree-
ment with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975 for the
expansion of nuclear industry in Brazil. The United States
had attempted to block this agreement. Despite contractual
arrangements and major policy commitments by the West
Germans to nuclear development in Brazil, 1981 was marked by
many reversals which finally ended in postponing completion




PLANNED NUCLEAR PLANTS: ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Construction Original Goal Electric Output
Start for Operation gross MW
Argentina Atucha I 1968 1974 367
Embalse 1974 1981 648
Atucha II 1979 1987 600
- - 1991 600
- - 1994 600
- - 1997 600
Brazil Angra 1 1971 1981 657
Angra 2 1976 1983 1325
Angra 3 1976 1984 1325
Nuclear 4 - 1990 1325
Nuclear 5 - 1990 1325
- - 1990 1325
- - 1990 1325
- - 1990 1325
— _ 1990 1325
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1978
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nuclear power program has run into problems ranging from
massive cost overruns to United States opposition. In con-
trast, the Argentine program has advanced rapidly, partly
due to the choice of using natural uranium technology. This
has freed Argentina from outside dependence. Presently,
Argentina possesses the most advanced nuclear energy program
in Latin America. 102
Scientific and industrial resources combined with
available uranium resources give Argentina and Brazil very
strong advantages in nuclear development. Argentina is pur-
suing an active effort to promote its heavy water/natural
uranium technology in cooperation with other Latin American
nations. An agreement was signed with Peru in March, 1977,
which has established a close working relationship between
the nuclear energy commissions of the two nations. Similar
agreements for nuclear cooperation exist with Paraguay,
Colombia and Uruguay. If Argentina gets other regional
nations to adopt natural uranium/heavy water technology,
then they would become dependent upon Argentina as a
regional supplier. Brazil has placed less emphasis on bi-
lateral relationships and concentrated on its own national
nuclear efforts. Brazil does have a program of nuclear
cooperation with Uruguay and an agreement to supply a
subcritical nuclear unit and other equipment to
Paraguay. 103 In 1979, Brazil initiated a cooperative
program with Venezuela which marked the first tangible
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indication of its interest in reexporting nuclear technology
and equipment received in part from more advanced nations.
In response to this, Argentina also signed an agreement with
them for nuclear cooperation in the same year. Both coun-
tries also have an established a nuclear cooperative rela-
tionship with Chile. 104 Argentina and Brazil have
established bilateral cooperative efforts outside the Latin
American regions (Argentina-India, Argentina-Libya, Brazil-
India, Argentina-South Korea, and Brazil-Iraq)
.
1 °^
In May, 1980, Argentina and Brazil signed an agree-
ment between themselves for nuclear cooperation. This
dampened the long nuclear rivalry between the two countries.
Both have tended to view nuclear energy as a major
contributing factor for their national development effort
and from the context of bilateral competition. Nuclear
power application has remained the one important area that
Argentina still maintains clear superiority over Brazil.
Argentina and Brazil, in contrast to other regions of the
world facing potential proliferation, have shown
considerable mutual restraint. Nevertheless, competition
for influence with other Latin American nations will
probably be a continuing factor affecting decision makers of
both nations. 106
Nuclear cooperative attempts between Argentina and
Brazil were made possible once a final settlement of the
protracted dam disputes on the Parana River were resolved in
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1979. A number of factors have contributed to the recent
trend toward Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence. There
have been economic incentives which impelled the Brazilian
nuclear establishment to favor linkage with Argentina.
Budgetary pressures in Brazil have caused diversion of
resources toward other energy sources (such as hydroelectric
development) and pressure from private industry has
increased Brazilian incentive to cooperate with Argentina.
In addition, both nations perceive that they will have a
greater capability to resist nuclear supplier pressure and
to counter restrictions on advanced technology. The
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship may have security
payoffs as both nations learn to appreciate the need to
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IV. DIVERSIFICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Argentina and Brazil have sought a new relationship with
the United States which has led their governments to take a
more active international role in searching for Third World
allies and to increase their interactions with economically
powerful nations other than the United States. Brazil has
primarily sought to increase its power through greatly
expanded activist foreign policies. Brazilian foreign poli-
cies on the global scale are manifested by its growing ties
with Third World nations, with Europe, and its Latin
American neighbors. Argentina and Brazil, due to their
size, are in a better bargaining position than their smaller
and less powerful neighbors. Intensification of nationalis-
tic ideologies at development and the increase in their
government's capabilities brought about foreign policies
which imposed minor restrictions and controls on foreign
investment; increased multilateral diplomacy in the region;
and increased diplomatic and economic relations beyond the
South American hemisphere.
A. DIVERSIFICATIONS OF CONTACTS
Brazil has one of the more developed foreign policies in
the Latin American region. Brazil is involved in a wider
range of issues and with a greater number of partners beyond
the continent than any other Latin American country.
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Brazilian interests are flexibly framed on an operational
case by case basis and are backed up with sophisticated
diplomatic and organizational skill. Brazil has also demon-
strated more policy continuity between administrations than
is typical for most Latin American nations as a whole. 1
The Brazilian autonomy in conducting its foreign affairs
can be highlighted by several recent events. In early 1982,
a group of Brazil's leading businessmen made a trip to Cuba
which proved to be very successful politically. The
incumbant foreign minister of Brazil has stated that Cuban
troops are in Angola because they were requested by the
government of that country. ^ The Angolan Foreign Minister
Paulo Jorge while on a scheduled visit to Brazil in
November, 1981 held talks with Brazilian Foreign Minister
Guerreiro, as well as meetings with the minister of economic
areas to discuss mechanisms to activate bilateral trade and
to launch technological cooperation programs. Brazil seems
interested in establishing closer political and economic
ties with Angola, but has strongly denied that any type of
military cooperation or arms sales would be desired. Brazil
has normally followed a policy of refusing to export arms to
potentially explosive areas of the world (such as South
Africa). Angola exports oil to Brazil (30,000 barrels per
day in 1981). Brasperto (Petrobras International
Incorporated) has been prospecting for oil in Angolan
territory and Brazil wants to broaden the cooperative effort
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so it can refine Angolan oil for export and to sell both
equipment and technology for the oil sector.-*
Argentina maintains diplomatic relations with most coun-
tries regardless of political organization or ideological
issue. Even the fervant an ti-communism of the military
governments who ruled Argentina between 1966 and 1973 did
not preclude commercial and cultural exchanges with the
Soviet Union and other East European countries. ^ The
government established relations with Cuba, Albania, the
German Democratic Republic, and North Korea in May and June
of 1973. The successor government of Juan Peron recognized
North Vietnam and Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China,
and Cuba; and Romania opened up trade offices in Argentina.
Argentina was the first country to extend medium trade
credit to Cuba, which provided for the furnishing of $200
million worth of equipment on an annual basis for a period
of six years. * More recently, a three-year extension was
signed in February, 1982, to the presently existing trade
agreement between Argentina and the Soviet Union. Argentina
has become a principle supplier of wheat to the Soviets ever
since Argentina refused to acknowledge the United States
grain embargo to the Soviet Union. 6
Although the old basis of relations in Western Europe
has declined, for Argentina the European Economy Community
(EEC) still provides the largest market for its beef.
Germany, Italy, and France offer primary sources of
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technology, weapons and investment capital. These countries
provide Argentina's major sources of imports after the
United States. Argentina has been hurt by protectionist
inclinations imposed on Argentina's agricultural exports by
the EEC. 7 The EEC became Brazil's chief economic partner
in the 1970s, with West Germany the most important, followed
by the United Kingdom and France. The EEC provided a market
for 30.5 percent of Brazil's exports in 1979, but Brazil
only received 0.8 percent of the EEC's exports. 8
Both Argentina and Brazil have extensive economic ties
with Japan. Japan appears as a natural market for Argentine
agricultural products, while Brazil has major appeal to
Japanese investors who are searching for raw materials.^
In March, 1981, a broad agreement was signed between Japan
and Argentina regarding Japan's investment in an Argentina
steel mill expansion project. Other identified Japanese
consortia include negotiated sales of plants and equipment
for electrification of the Roca Railroad on the outskirts of
Buenos Aires, for modernization of a communications network,
and for construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the
Rio Parana between Argentina and Paraguay. 1 ^ Japan's
Deputy Finance Minister Watonake Kiichi was said to say
while in Sao Paulo that Brazil will continue to be the third
best option for Japanese investments, following that of the
United States and Indonesia. 11
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Brazil, who seeks markets both for her raw products and
manufactured goods, will deal with any African nation
regardless of ideology, race or political organization.
Cultivation of the friendship of the African nations has
been seen as a means for obtaining new Brazilian mar-
kets. 2 in addition, the importance of political and
economic coordination among members of the Third World was
stressed as a side issue by the Brazil-Nigeria-Ivory Coast-
Senegal Trade Relation Seminar sponsored in Sao Paulo.
Brazilian-Nigerian trade has developed from $22 million to
$1.5 billion in the last ten years. 1 -* Zambia has
expressed interest in establishing agricultural trade with
Brazil and receiving scientific cooperation for the produc-
tion of cattle and foodstuffs. 14 Brazil's Foreign
Minister Guerreiro has led trade delegations to Mozambique,
Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabue, Nigeria, and Senegal.
In the last decade, Brazilian trade with Africa has
increased six fold. 15
United States bilateral economic assistance to Latin
American countries has decreased since the mid 1960s, when
the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) programs played an important role in Latin American
trade capacity. In 1967, when Brazil's total imports
amounted to $1,496 million, USAID' s $329 million totalled 22
percent of Brazil's foreign exchange import requirements.
By 1979, the situation had changed dramatically; Brazil
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imported over $17 billion worth of goods, and along with
Mexico and Venezuela, it received no USAID funds. The
United States recognized Brazil as an emerging middle power,
and as a power center in its own right.'"
Argentina and Brazil, by diversification of economic
relations were able to increase their bargaining power.
Brazil has been more successful at this policy than
Argentina. The United States share of Brazilian trade in
1967-68 was 32.2 percent; in 1974, it was only 21.5 percent.
The United States still remains the largest foreign investor
in Brazil, but its share of total investment is down. It
accounted for nearly 50 percent in the middle and late
1960s, but in 1974 accounted for only 37 percent.^
Table 5 demonstrates the extent of diversification of
Brazilian exports achieved over the decade.
TABLE 5
Distribution of Brazilian Exports, 1970, 1979











Source : Infobrazil bulletin, Center of Brazilian Studies,
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Argentina pursued a policy which attempted to avoid
becoming overly dependent on United States capital and
products much earlier than Brazil. Argentina has attempted
to balance the import-export situation by buying from more
countries with which it had a favorable trade balance.
^
The United States investment in Argentina stood at $1.5
billion at the end of 1977 and the United States trade sur-
plus with Argentina totalled $348 million in 1977, the
largest in Latin America. ^
Latin American countries have expanded their bilateral
and multilateral ties to developed and developing nations
worldwide. In turn, countries beyond the region have
increased their interactions with Latin American nations.
Argentina and Brazil are prepared to cooperate as necessary
with a wide variety of countries which they perceive share
interests relevant to their developmental and security
goals. They seek viable international and economic rela-
tionships which balance their need to trade and expand their
export markets. Diversification of international economic
relationships and the drive for economic independence
influence both Argentine and Brazilian diplomatic efforts
and foreign policy goals.
Even though strong economic ties still exist between the
United States with both Argentina and Brazil, their
increased trade and investment relationships with other
countries have allowed them to become less dependent on the
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United States. Measured globally Argentina and Brazil are
both more interdependent in their relationships with other
nations of the world.
B. RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS
Independence in foreign policy has been a long standing
tradition for Argentina. Argentina sought to restrain
American influence much earlier than Brazil. Schemes to
organize a Pan American system were seen by Argentina as an
attempt to threaten free trade and vital extrahemispheric
relationships. In the League of Nations, Argentina quickly
adopted an independent and forceful course, striving to
extend its view on nonintervention and the sovereign equal-
ity of states to the global level. Argentina's traditional
policies of independence and pursuit of national greatness
proved to be liabilities after World War II. During the
war, it opposed successive United States efforts to organize
first, Latin American neutrality, and then, support for the
allied cause. Argentina opted for noncooperation while
Brazil joined the war effort. When Brazil received lend-
lease aid which it used to modernize its armed forces and
create steel and shipbuilding industries as a reward for
supporting the United States, the local balance of power
became unsettled. Out of this a resentment grew in
Argentina toward the United States, as did a determination
to regain Argentina's rightful place. Only after Argentina
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perceived that it might be excluded from the United Nations
did it finally declare war on Germany. Argentine govern-
ments have continued to pursue international recognition,
influence, and the recovery of what is regarded as their
important and rightful place in world councils. 20
Brazil's foreign relations have surpassed those of
Argentina in terms of national capabilities, and it ranks at
the top of both the less developed countries (LDC's) and the
middle powers. 2 ' Brazilian authoritarianism, though well-
established, has been characterized by a willingness to com-
promise, to be flexible, to respond pragmatically, and to
avoid open and disruptive conflict. Brazil's rising inter-
national autonomy both politically and economically has
given it a wide range of policy options. One consequence of
this has been Brazil's deviation from United States foreign
policy objectives in recent years. Brazil supported a 200-
mile territorial limit and voted against Zionism in 1975 in
the United Nations. 22 Yet the United States still
remains Brazil's largest source of bank finance, and largest
foreign investor. Brazil is careful to avoid conflicts, as
is Argentina, that will hurt their primary interest
overall. 2 -*
The United States is Argentina's largest source of
capital, technology, private and intergovernmental loans and
credits, imports, and the third largest market. Argentina
has learned to relate to the United States and now uses the
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interAmerican system it once opposed to build diplomatic
support on critical economic issues such as preferable
treatment for the exports of less developed countries.
Argentina suffers from the fortune and misfortune of having
become a semi-industrialized nation with conflicting inter-
nal and external interests. These conflicts have been re-
flected in its alternative foreign policies. It seeks trade
and investment from the industrial powers and yet joins the
underdeveloped nations to force changes in the rules.
Argentina, and less so Brazil, seek to be alternately or
simultaneously western and Third World, a developed country
and an advanced underdeveloped country. *
The petroleum price rises of the 1970s forced Brazil to
look closely at its bilateral relationship with the United
States. Either Washington refused or was unwilling to help
a desperate Brazil confront the energy crisis. In 1974,
Brazil was told that the United States could not guarantee
processed fuel for Brazilian nuclear reactors that
Westinghouse was constructing at the time. Since energy was
vital for Brazil's existence, nuclear energy played an
important role in Brazil's struggle to cope with the 1973
OPEC crisis. Brazil turned away from Washington for assis-
tance and established the West German nuclear deal. Brazil
has been actively involved in seeking energy alternatives




One of the greatest sources of friction during the 1970s
for Brazil was its relations with the United States. The
Nixon and Ford administrations sought to court Brazil as the
chief United States ally in South America, but they made the
erroneous assumption that Brazil was willing to be subser-
vient to Washington's wishes. A 1976 Memorandum of Under-
standing was signed between Brazil and the United States
establishing the guidelines for mutual consultation and
cooperation. Although Brazil responded positively to the
promotion in status which this agreement implied, the agree-
ment floundered because Brazil refused to play the role of
American protege. ^6
The Carter administration recognized the country of
Brazil as a growing power but soured the relationship in
1977 through 1978 over the issues of nuclear power and human
rights. Unresolved trade disagreements further aggravated
the relationship. In response to American auditing of human
rights performance as a precondition for continued foreign
aid, Brazil cancelled a 1954 military assistance agreement
with the United States and refused further American military
aid. The period of coolness which developed was not alle-
viated by Carter's April, 1978 trip to Brazil. Both
Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo declined to include a visit
to Washington in their foreign travels. Toward the end of
the Carter administration, America began to view Brazil from
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a new perspective, and both sides looked toward resuming a
closer relationship based on a more equal partnership. 2 '
The Carter administration's criticism of the Argentine
regime of General Jorge Rafael Videla, in its human rights
report to Congress in 1977, and the subsequent cut in mili-
tary assistance credits affected relations between Argentina
and the United States. A formal ban on arms sales to
Argentina was passed by the United States Congress in 1978.
The Reagan administration urged the Congress to lift the ban
in 1981 on grounds that there had been a reduction in human
rights abuses and that the cooperation of Argentina was
essential for the collective defense of the hemisphere. 2 **
The Argentine government hoped that the close of the
Carter administration would end United States human rights
policies and relieve Argentina of foreign criticism over the
issue. President Videla' s successor, Roberto Viola, warmly
welcomed the Reagan administration and Viola was similarly
received by President Reagan when he visited the United
States just before his inauguration. President Reagan prom-
ised not to make human rights a public issue. 2 ^
Argentina and Brazil were alienated by the human rights
standard as applied by the Carter administration toward
American arms sales. Both countries viewed it as an act of
foreign interference in their internal affairs and an af-
front to to their nation's dignity. The United States lost
arms sales as an instrument of influence and leverage. 30
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When Washington decided to impose a ban on grain sales
to the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan,
Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpastor, Superintendent of
the United States Military Academy and former supreme allied
commander in Europe, was sent to Argentina to speak to
General Videla about Argentina joining the United States in
its sanctions against the Soviet Union. Goodpastor was
flatly turned down despite the fact that Argentine military
leaders are no friends of the Soviets. Videla pointedly
asked when the United States would restore military equip-
ment sales and stop denouncing human rights violations.
Soon after, Buenos Aires signed a five-year agreement with
the Soviet Union to provide grain. The United States has
also been equally ineffective in persuading Argentina to
follow its nuclear nonproliferation policy. Completing a
three-year stay in Argentina, American Ambassador Raoul H.
Castro complained that "we keep asking Argentina to do
things for us, but we don't offer anything in return. "31
Both Argentina and Brazil have found commercial
relations with the Soviet bloc to be very profitable and
desires for greater trade will probably increase. In July
1981, Soviet traders signed a contract with Brazil to import
annually 600,000 tons of soy, virtually wiping out the need
to import from America. Although the Soviet Union cut back
on its oil deliveries to Eastern Europe in 1981, Moscow
tripled its oil sales to Brazil to 30,000 barrels a day.
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The oil deal is part of a five-year, $5 billion trade pack-
age signed in July, 1981. In return for soy, corn, soccer-
balls, and one million pairs of blue jeans, the Brazilians
will receive a wood ethanol factory, five hydroelectric
turbines, and Soviet expertise in petroleum exploration.
Permanent trade missions have been established in both
Moscow and Brasilia and plans have been discussed for joint
Brazil-USSR highway and hydroelectric projects in Peru,
Angola, and Ethopia. 32
Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro, regarding the
international behaviour of the "super poteneras", stated:
...they seek to reinvigorate alliances and blocks and to
reaffirm vertically dependent relationships. The idea of
an international community is replaced by a dichotomy of
friend and enemy, in which the very concept of friend-
ship is utilized as an instrument to further reinforce
vertical dependence and the concept of loyal friend is
corrupted to mean docile ally or satellite. There have
reappeared, at times very subtly, the concepts of zones
of influence and areas of vital interest, within which
the different countries are viewed as homogeneous pieces
in a game of power, exposed to the different strategies
of the contenders, without any serious consideration of
the interest of the other countries. 33
During the Falklands dispute, Argentina and the Soviet
Union were both using each others relationship to maximum
advantage. Argentina presented an open-minded attitude
about Moscow and one influential Argentine military officer
was reportedly heard to say: "We will have to take the sup-
port from those who offer it. If that has to come from the
Soviets, that does not frighten me." Moscow was given an
opportunity to weaken the Argentine support for El Salvador
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which the United States cultivated. Relations between
Argentina and the USSR have steadily improved since
Argentina refused to honor the grain embargo. In terms of
trade, the Soviet Union has become Argentina's largest
customer for grain and oil-seed exports. A separate
five-year accord between Argentina and the Soviet Union
specifies that the Soviets will also buy between 60,000 and
100,000 tons of boneless Argentine beef a year. The Soviets
have also reportedly agreed to supply 220 pounds of enriched
uranium and one ton of reactor coolant heavy water for
Argentina's nuclear program. During the Falklands dispute,
Argentina was careful not to draw too close to the Soviet
Union. While American-owned businesses have a book value of
$1.85 billion in Argentina, the Soviets have no investments
there. 34
Both Argentina and Brazil claim the right to be auto-
nomous international actors. They both will continue to
maintain their own kind of relationship with the United
States, but are not afraid to strike out on their own inter-
national objectives, which may or may not come on line with
United States objectives. They have both developed an inde-
pendent foreign policy and intend to maintain it. Argentina
and Brazil need their relationships with the superpowers,
but neither Argentina or Brazil desires their interference
in the formulation of their foreign policies. Argentina and
Brazil have the inclination and the ability to resist being
111

the pawns of either superpower, the United States or Soviet
Union, but that does not preclude relations with both.
C. RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Argentina and Brazil do not display a consistent policy
of supporting nonalignment association with Third World
nations. The Brazilian foreign minister, while addressing
the Atlantic General Assembly of the OAS in 1974, expressed
the view that the era of automatic alignment had passed.
For instance, Brazil does not favor the debt moratorium
advocated by the less successful Third World nations. 35
Although both Argentina and Brazil identify with some Third
World causes, they have sought the best that both the under-
developed and the developed world have to offer. Brazil has
followed a pragmatic course which allowed it to evaluate
individual issues, yet this course of action often eschewed
its high visibility as an advocate of Third World causes.
Brazil favored individual proposals that are most important
for its own purposes. Brazil has been selective in the
causes it endorses, and its position as the largest single
importer among the LDC's, as the largest exporter, and the
third largest LDC in terms of population, places it in a
natural leadership position. 3 **
Argentina has never been afraid to champion the cause of
the Third World and has often used the United Nations as a
forum for its expressions of solidarity with the Third World.
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Argentina suffered some setback with regards to Third World
countries' support for Britain during the Falklands War, and
the day Argentina invaded the Falklands its rugby team was
playing in South Africa. Argentina has sought to challenge
the international political and economic status quo and to
benefit from it. While Argentina needs trade and investment
from the industrial powers, it joins the underdeveloped
nations to force changes in the rules. Argentina's foreign
policy reflects this conflict as it alternately or simul-
taneously seeks to be a Western and a Third World
nation. 37
Argentina and Brazil will continue to identify with
Third World countries, but their foreign policies, as
always, will be guided by what is good for them. Argentina
and Brazil have ceded some of their sovereignty gladly in
their efforts to gain the economic benefits of global inter-
dependence. Both countries will find themselves more and
more committed to forums and agencies pursuing the coopera-
tive and peaceful management of their international and
regional problems of economic and physical welfare. How-
ever, time only will tell if Argentina has learned a lesson
in the aftermath of the Falklands War and whether Brazil
will be able to remain uninvolved in regional and Third
World causes. Argentina and Brazil will continue to be
influenced by the superpowers, but they both will attempt
to show them that they make their own decisions. Argentina
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and Brazil have achieved certain autonomy of action and
independence, but their increased interactions with other
nations make them more interdependent.
D. WORLD ORDER ISSUES
1. New International Economic Order (NIEO)
Many Third World countries have sought to restruc-
ture the present international economic system and their
blueprint for a brighter future is the New International
Economic Order. A group of seventy-seven nations (The Group
of 77) detailed the outline for the NIEO in 1974 in the
Declaration and Action Programme adopted by the Sixth
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
Since 1974, the proposals have been reworded and debated at
innumerable international conferences, but many proposals of
the NIEO, while sounding fine, are unrelated to the real
world of the present and near-future international system.
Some reforms have been accepted by the industrial states
that reflect sentiments expressed in the Group of 77 's
proposals. Industrial states have expanded multilateral aid
and long-term export credits, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has established an extended fund facility to help
nations adjust gradually to balance of payment problems.
The industrial states judged that the reforms would
strengthen the whole international system. Industrial
states were not threatened by the Group of 77, but they
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recognized that capital-short developing nations needed more
external credit if they were to be able to continue to
import the industrial world's goods, while still meeting
payments on past debts. 38
Most NIEO proposals do not threaten to drastically
change the existing international system, yet some proposals
pressing for higher commodity prices and more official
development assistance would transfer resources to the Third
World. Additionally, some proposals would affect the global
power balance by transferring decisionmaking power to offi-
cial bodies, such as the United Nations, where the Third
World is influential or dominant. The industrial states
have consistently and successfully parried these by the
Group of 77. The North-South dialogue will not signifi-
cantly alter the world system if the industrial states are
unwilling to change it. 39
Latin American states have endorsed the NIEO, but
many remain for the most part only token members of the non-
aligned movement and Group of 77. Many differences separate
Latin American countries from those of Africa and Asia.
These differences include their European ethnic composition,
Western cultural values, and traditional trans-Atlantic
trading patterns. Latin American states have been described
as the "Achilles heel" of the Third World movement because
of their willingness to break ranks if self-interests and
Third World solidarity pose conflicting demands. 40 The
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higher level of development of most Latin American countries
puts the region in a special status in the North-South rela-
tionship. Until recently, Latin America was a guiding force
in the Third World and most of its ideas about the relation-
ship between the rich and poor countries emanated from the
region, as did most of the demands of the Group of 77. With
the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
countries (OPEC) and the nonaligned nations movement, Third
World issues became clouded to the point that Latin American
countries found their interests coinciding less clearly with
those of other LDCs. 41
Argentina and Brazil would gain little by joining
membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) , which consists of the world's developed
countries. On the other hand, the industrial countries of
the OECD are ambivalent about Brazil's status. Some have
classified Brazil as an industrial country in the clothing
of an LDC and, therefore, not deserving of special treatment
as an LDC. Argentina and Brazil, as economically more
advanced Third World countries, could reap benefits from the
NIEO. The more economically advanced Third World countries
could take immediate advantage of cheaper technology,
greater control over capital and financial resources, and
improved market access for their manufacturers . ^2
Brazil resists categorization with common labels
such as Latin American, Third World, nonaligned, East-West,
116

or North-South because it has a diversity of interests and
desires flexibility to pursue varied courses of action on
different issues. Brazilians have trouble defining their
country's basic international position. Brazil aspires to
join the ranks of the industrial Western nations while it
perceives itself as a developing country with strong foreign
trade, financial and technological and important ethnic ties
to, and common interests with, the Third World. Generally,
Brazil leans toward strenuous activism as a champion of LDC
rights when leading from a weak hand, and when it needs to
supplement its unilateral or bilateral efforts to gain
specific goals, such as, improving price parity or expanding
export markets. Brazilian foreign policy guards against
multilateral measures which could threaten its own freedom
of action or access to resources. Brazil has not been will-
ing to be tied either to the interests common to industrial
states or to the proposals reflected in the strategy formu-
lated by the Group of 77. Brazil will face future problems
in trying to bridge the gap between developing countries and
LDCs.4 3 Brazil's best option lies in finding a viable
and accepted role between the have and have-not countries
which does not involve competing for leadership in any
contending bloc.
The demands for an NIEO presented Argentina's
foreign policy community with a real dilemma. Argentina can
neither stand aloof or ignore new centers of economic,
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political, and financial powers, nor can it antagonize the
major industrial powers which so strongly affect its econ-
omic destiny. Argentina became a member of the nonaligned
nation bloc during the Algiers Conference of September,
1973. Membership reflected an independent foreign policy
and demonstrated that Argentina was equidistant from the two
imperialisms. The bloc also offered Argentina an opportu-
nity to associate with a group seeking reform of the inter-
national economic system, to curry favor with oilexporting
countries, and to obtain diplomatic backing on specific
issues. Argentina sought to avoid entanglements with the
memberships' interest in political issues. Argentina has
acted with the Third World through the Group of 77, to
promote restructuring of world economic and monetary rela-
tions in its favor. Argentina, as a nearly developed
country, has real, probably unabridgeable policy differences
with the vast majority of the LDCs . However, its economic
dependence and desire to obtain whatever preferential treat-
ment is given to LDCs keeps it within the bloc. Argentina
has interests in, and identifies with, both the developed
and developing world, but possesses allies in neither. ^4
Eventually, Argentina and Brazil may be forced to side with
the group which they perceive best serves their own national




2. Law of the Sea (LOS)
Unilateral claims to deep seabed resources, claims
of 200-mile territorial seas, oil spills over large areas of
ocean and coastlines, and the demands of the Third World for
an NIEO have focussed global attention on the world's
oceans. Increased use of ocean space has resulted in con-
flicts over ocean resources and access to ocean space.
Technological breakthroughs in ocean exploration and
exploitation techniques since World War II and the demands
of developing countries have forced a reexamination of the
Laws of the Sea. 45
The United Nations' Law of the Sea Conferences have
convened since 1958, when the first conference (UNCLOS I)
dealt with the issues of territorial seas, the contiguous
zone, and fishery zones. Four draft conventions were rati-
fied by a sufficient number of states, which effectively
codified the traditional Law of the Sea. The conference was
unsuccessful, however, in determining the breadth of the
territorial sea and in establishing exclusive fishing zones.
UNCLOS II met in the Spring of 1960, and eighty-seven coun-
tries unsuccessfully tried to "tie up the loose ends" left
by the first conference. On June 24, 1974, the first
session of UNCLOS III began. 46
On December 6, 1982, representatives of 119 nations
culminated fifteen years of labor when they signed the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The
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Convention "replaces the traditional laissez faire system of
freedom of the seas with an emerging system of management."
It puts 40 percent of the ocean and its bottom adjacent to
the coasts of the continents and islands under the manage-
ment of the states in possession of those coasts. 60 per-
cent of the surface area and water below has been reserved
for the traditional freedom of the seas, but the wealth of
the ocean floor has been deeded to the Common Heritage of
Mankind. The resources of the ocean floor are placed under
the management of an International Seabed Authority, which
has the capacity to generate income, the power of taxation
and a kind of imminent domain over ocean-exploiting techno-
logy. The United States, the Soviet Union and fifteen other
major industrial nations withheld their signatures from the
Convention out of opposition to the Seabed Authority. These
nations did sign the Final Act of the Conference. The
Convention has not been ratified by the majority of nations
necessary to give it the force of law. 47
Argentina, regarding law of the sea issues, sought
support in a Latin American bloc of like-minded states.
Specific positions taken by Latin American countries origi-
nated in disputes between the Pacific coast countries and
the United States over fisheries. Peru, Chile, and Ecuador
pledged support of a 200-mile maritime zone and sovereignty
over the seabed and continental shelf to 200 miles in the
Declaration of Santiago, signed August, 1952. Peron had
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previously declared the continental shelf subject to
national jurisdiction in 1946, but the Argentine government
did not adhere to this position strongly or attempt to
enforce this ruling. There was no Latin American multi-
lateral consensus at the first conference of the LOS in
1958. 48
The scramble for jurisdiction and the sustained
diplomacy of Peru ultimately led to the creation of a Latin
American bloc by the UNCLOS III in 1974. Argentina,
provoked by a similar Brazilian claim, had declared an ill-
defined 200-mile zone of coastal waters in 1966. Four years
later on Peru's instigation Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Chile,
Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay at Montevideo
declared that the coastal state controlled all natural
resources out to 200 miles. In contrast to Brazil, Panama
and Ecuador, which recognized innocent passage, Argentina
expanded its claim to full sovereignty. Argentina did later
indicate it might be willing to seek a twelve-mile territo-
rial sea and a less restrictive economic zone to 200
miles. 49
Brazil has demonstrated an independent law of the
sea position and its aggressiveness led to a 1970 decree
extending national maritime jurisdiction to 200 miles. This
claim was stimulated by concern over national security as
well as protection of natural resources. This decree
included jurisdiction of the airspace, ocean surface, ocean
121

body, ocean floor, and the seabed. Brazil has some 4,500
miles of coastline and this measure represented assertion of
control of over 900,000 square miles. Brazil allowed inno-
cent passage, but required foreign fishing vessels to obtain
licenses. ^^
By 1972, Brazil saw itself as an LDC front runner in
its defense of full sovereignty for coastal states over
resources from the ocean's surface down through the seabed.
By the start of UNCLOS III in 1974, the Brazilian position
with its demand of control of navigation within 200 miles of
the coast was supported by only ten countries (mostly
Spanish American, except Somalia, Sierra Leone, the
Philippines, and South Korea). The Mexican concept of a
patrimonial sea (200 miles of economic rights, only twelve
miles of full sovereignty) had gained so much ground that
Brazil had nearly isolated itself in its extreme total
sovereignty position. Brazil demonstrated great flexibility
during the conference on the issue of navigation and over-
flights, but continued to maintain its sovereignty position
over live and mineral resources and pollution and research
matters within 200 miles. 51
Brazil was well within the consensus of the LDCs as
a sponsor of the United Nations Assembly Resolution 2574 D
(1969), prohibiting exploitation of or claim of the seabed
and ocean floor until an international regime not subject to
great power veto had established licenses and management of
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exploration, research, and use for general international
benefit and technology transfer to the LDCs. Over time
Brazil willingly moved somewhat toward the American position
which favors private companies for seabed mining, but was
always careful to emphasize an interest in the protection of
LDCs' economies. In the area of seabed mining, Brazil has
been making common cause with LDC mineral producers (Peru,
Chile, Guyana, Zaire, Zambia, Gohan, Morocco, and China) .2
By 1976, Brazil was willing to consider an exclusive
economic zone. As a middle power and an emerging shipping
power, Brazil had much .more in common with the developed
countries' position. By the end of the 1970s, Brazil
quietly reversed its original position on a 200-mile terri-
torial sea. At the UNCLOS III session in Geneva in late
July, 1980, Brazil gave its support to a 12-mile territorial
sea and a 188-mile exclusive economic zone. Brazil was
willing to compromise its position and support the Exclusive
Economic Zone because it conflicted with its own national
interests. ^3
Argentina and Brazil signed the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Both nations pursued
their own independent foreign policy in regards to law of
the sea issues and refused to be influenced by the position
advocated by the United States. Argentina and Brazil sought
to expand their national jurisdiction into the ocean, but
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realized international cooperation afforded the best
opportunity to maintain their economic health.
3 . Antarctica Claims
On December 1, 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was signed
by the United States, the Soviet Union, and ten other
nations. These nations pledged for a period of thirty years
to make use of the Antarctic continent for peaceful purposes
only and to ensure freedom for scientific research. Under
the Treaty, existing territorial claims remained unaffected,
but new claims and the enlargement of existing claims was
prohibited.^ 4 The Antarctic Treaty went into force in
June, 1961, and is subject to major review in 1991. The
Treaty suspended resolution of territorial claims.
The South Atlantic region extending to Antarctic has
become a new focus of international concern since the
Falklands War. The area potentally represents untapped
mineral and fishing resources; commerce between South
America and Africa utilizes the southern sea lanes; and war-
ships must use the Straits of Magellan as an alternative to
the Panama Canal. Additionally, the future disposition of
Antarctica could affect the global environment. All these
factors are of great interest to those Latin American coun-
tries that have come "to regard Antarctica and its surround-
ing waters as a strategic zone, a potential resource, and
the last economic and psychological frontier. "^^
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The Latin American continent as a whole views the
disposition of Antarctica as one of a series of key territo-
rial and jurisdictional issues bearing on the sovereignty of
developing countries. As these countries have shifted their
outlook toward a global system, Antarctica has become a test
case for the assertion of their distinct interests against
superpower domination. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have
demonstrated the most active interest in Antarctica. 56
In response to a series of British expeditions in
Antarctica, successive Argentine governments in 1884 and
1900 declared the region was part of Patagonia, the coun-
try's southern most region. In 1904, Argentine meteorolo-
gists replaced a Scottish team at the observatory on Laurie
Island in the South Orkneys. This meteorological station
has remained in Argentina's possession. In 1927, through
its own efforts, Argentina built a radio-telegraphic station
in the South Orkneys. Argentina and Chile held inconclusive
diplomatic talks concerning Antarctica delimitation in 1906,
but until the 1940s neither regarded its territorial claims
too seriously. Interest was stimulated by initiatives of
countries outside the South Atlantic region. Norway
delimited its claim to a portion of Antarctica in 1939 and
invited interested parties to attend the International
exhibition of Polar Exploration in 1940. In response to




In November, 1940, Chile made formal claim to the
area from West longitude 53 to 90 degrees. Representatives
of Argentina and Chile agreed that a South American claim
did exist and that their two governments held exclusive
sovereign rights. In 1951, Argentina made formal claim to
the sector from 25 to 74 degrees West longitude. This claim
overlapped 21 degrees of the Chilean claim. Argentina and
Chile established bases in the late 1940s, and despite
adherence to the Antarctica Treaty, both have continued to
maintain their respective bases and claims. Strategically,
control of the Drake Passage and the Strait of Magellan have
intensified the dispute over the Beagle Channel between
Argentina and Chile. ^
Argentina's claim has been based on extending the
meridians of its frontier to the pole. The acronym, La
Atlantartida, defines recent Argentine geopolitial thinking
as: "that geopolitical space which integrates eastern South
America, Southwest Africa, the Antarctic continent and the
vast sea which lands demarcate. . .a geopolitical challenge to
Argentina from now into the twenty-first century."
Brazilian geopolitical thought, based on the theory of de
frontacao has argued that countries "facing" Antarctica
should have a claim to the opposite coast therein. ^9
Brazilian foreign policy theorists generally have
not accepted Argentinean and Chilean claims, but have
addressed the idea of a general "American or Latin American"
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sector between and 120 degrees East latitude. Brazil has
studiously ignored national claims in Antarctica. Brazil
has expressed growing interest in the potential mineral and
natural resources of the Antarctic region and had made prep-
arations for its first expedition to the area in late
1982.°0 Brazil has made no formal claim to Antarctica,
but has left its options open. In 1975, Brazil became the
nineteenth member to agree to adhere to the Treaty of
Antarctica. By participating in the Treaty, Brazil reserved
for itself the option of an active role in the conference
and joint programs which are likely to occur as interna-
tional interest in Antarctica's resources grows. It also
gives sufficient time for Brazil to determine its own
interests. *>1 Brazil has opened the door to a possible
claim in the future.
A major review of the Antarctica Treaty in 1991 most
likely will occur and it will present a difficult task.
Long-standing border disputes and territorial conflicts in
South America will be an obstacle to more effective integra-
tion and cooperation in a variety of areas and organiza-
tions, including the OAS . Argentina's disputes with Chile
over the Beagle Channel and with Great Britain over the
Falkland Islands have direct relevance for the future
disposition of South American claims in Antarctica. Another
serious complicating factor in a review process will be the
play of interests of many nations outside South America, not
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just consultative members of the Treaty. Growing interna-
tional interest in Antarctica has been further stimulated by
the global search for scarce and marketable resources. 62
Uncompromising positions on sovereign rights by
Argentina or Chile could hamper any negotiations. Argentina
and Chile both have supplemented their territorial claims in
recent years. Argentina has provided quarters for women and
children at one of its Antarctica bases. Buenos Aires has
appointed a governor for the area it has referred to as its
Antarctica territory on all national maps, and since 1968
has officially promoted tourist visits to the Argentine sec-
tor. The Argentine military has established an Antarctica
airbase, which Aerolinas Argentina, its national airline,
uses as a stopping point in transpolar air service. Recent
Chilean efforts have been limited to krill fishing, but it
has linked its Antarctic claims to settlement of the boun-
dary between Argentina and itself in the Beagle Channel
below Tierra del Fuego and to the delimitation of the
200-mile resource zone that both countries claim in
surrounding seas. Brazil, ignoring Chilean and Argentine
territoral claims, asserts an unfettered right to
exploration and scientific research. 63
In final analysis, the greatest interest of
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil in Antarctica may be stimulated
by the strategic implications control the maritime zones at
the tip of South America represents. Argentina and Brazil
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aware of the growing strategic problem posed by the African
based Soviet naval presence in the South Atlantic and the
importance of the southern passage as the only route for
larger warships and submarines. "The Falklands War is a
reminder that major powers can project their influence over
vast areas with minimal reliance on land bases." The more
useable sub-Antarctic and South Atlantic islands could be
used as potential bases by outside powers, or for Argentine
and Chilean points of influence against such powers. 64
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have established either
territorial claims or declarations of national interest in
Antarctic and surrounding waters. All three are studying
how to exploit the economic resources of the area. Con-
flicting claims and attempts to exercise sovereignty and
exploitation of Antarctic resources will inevitably lead to
future conflict of interests. Hopefully, a major review of
the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 will provide a system or
instrument to resolve conflict of interests between con-
sultative parties and protect their interests from the out-
side world. It is unlikely that Argentina and Chile will be
able to hold exclusive rights to their claim, especially
with Brazil's developing interests in the region.
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A. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL
Argentina and Brazilian prospects for continued develop-
ment are affected by the internal questions raised by social
and economic factors in conjunction with the tensions that
are created by international goals and national constraints.
Brazil's capacity to steer its own development course has
increased and is greater than Argentina's. The following
statement by the late J. A. de Aruajo Castro, a career diplo-
mat who served for many years as Brazil's Ambassador to
Washington, reflects the Brazilian attitude:
No country can escape its destiny and fortunately, or
unfortunately, Brazil is condemned to greatness....
Small mediocre solutions are neither appropriate nor
interesting to Brazil.... We have to think big and plan
on a grand scale.... In a word: the primordial objec-
tive of the Foreign Policy of Brazil is the neutraliza-
tion of all external factors which might limit its
national power. This policy could be neither more
authentic nor more Brazilian. Nationalism is not, for
us, an attitude of isolation, of prevention, or of
hostility. It is on the contrary, a strong impulse
toward international participation.
*
Major hindrances which continue to affect Brazil's
development are escalating cost for energy (85 percent of
the petroleum used is imported) , a drop in economic growth
rates, lagging social welfare levels, inflation, and a huge
foreign debt. In July, 1983, Brazil recorded 13 percent
inflation for that one month and close to 170 percent over
the previous twelve months. Brazil expects to pay off $11
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billion US of its external debt in 1983 based on: 1) the
strength of a $6 billion US trade surplus; 2) having with-
held payments of principle since June; and 3) postponing
repayment of government-to-government loans. Brazil then
plans to pay off another $11 billion US next year, and in
1986 some $26 billion US. Whether or not these targets are
attainable or even realistic is questionable. Some experts
reckon that in the meantime Brazil's debt will rise from $90
billion US to $130 billion US. 2 It is unlikely that
Brazil will achieve imminent major power status as many had
predicted a few years ago. Brazil's voice on the interna-
tional scene is listened to, but its economic resilience and
future capabilities for economic expansion will become more
and more dependent on its diplomatic ability to find energy
resources. Brazil is exploring alternate forms of energy
resources, but as in the case of Japan, Brazil's vulnerabi-
lity strongly influences its foreign policy determination.
In the past, Brazil's hope for oil supplies led it to be one
of the first noncommunist countries to recognize the pro-
Soviet faction of Angola as the official government, and to
dramatically change its Middle East policy towards support
of the Arab nations during the OPEC crisis. 3
If energy production and consumption were used as mea-
sures of development, then Argentina would rank as devel-
oped. Argentina's per capita consumption exceeds Brazil.
Argentina ranked thirteenth in world usage per capita and
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Brazil placed far behind. Argentina has adequate oil
reserves and is not dependent on petroleum imports for its
well-being as Brazil is. Argentina has projects underway to
tap the hydroelectric potential of the Plata River system
and has a well-established nuclear energy program.
Argentina is more immune to an international energy crisis
than Brazil, which suffers more severe petroleum-induced
balance of payment drains and the hazards of greater
dependence of Arab oil. 4
Argentina's exports are less diversified than Brazil's.
Argentina's foreign trade position is more volatile in the
short term than Brazil's. This is because of dependence on
a few export products and the linkages between semi-control-
lable internal factors, such as industrialization, and the
political struggle between urban and rural groups, organized
labor and other sectors. On the other hand, Brazilian
industrial expansion has been secured at the price of a
rising oil import bill and foreign debt.^ Both Argentine
and Brazilian dependence on the world economy and their
international search for prestige and influence are primary
determinents to their foreign policy decisions. Both have
sought to diversify their trading partners and markets,
while maintaining traditional cultural ties with Europe and
the United States. These diversified economic opportunities
have the long range policy objectives of establishing
international importance and independence.
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Both Argentina and Brazil are concerned about their
mounting international debt. Brazil's Finance Minister
Galveas has stated that there is a need to attract foreign
funds to make up the balance of payments deficit, while cur-
tailing foreign purchases. According to Galveas, the
resumption of economic growth is being aided by the govern-
ment which is: "doing all it can to promote economic growth
as long as it does not increase inflation and threaten the
balance of payments."**
Argentine Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion, when he ad-
dressed a speech to the Ninth OAS General Assembly, remarked
that countries are moving toward an economic disaster
because they are unable to curb the sustained increase of
their already huge foreign debt, stop inflation and balance
off their trade and payment balance. He heavily scorned the
protectionist attitudes of developed nations; and pointed
out that most Latin American countries are moving toward the
abyss of insolvency at the foreign level. He further
indicated that integration has ceased to be a medium-term
prospect.
^
The political instability in Argentina and the fighting
in the Falklands did much to damage Argentina's image and
economic position. Argentina may face trouble if it wishes
to purchase arms from some European countries in the future,
and the tight embargo imposed by the EEC on Argentina during
the crisis caused damage to Argentina's export market.
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However, Argentina has been primarily hurt by the increased
lending rates necessary to finance its existing outstanding
external debts, which stood at $34 billion in late 1982.
^
Indications are that Argentina will double its presently
projected 160 percent inflation figure for 1983. Argentina
is expected to show a substantial trade surplus (around $3
billion US), but this will not suffice to cover interest
payments. There have been delays in the refinancing of $7
billion US in public indebtedness that matures this year,
and next year Argentina will have to refinance close to $10
billion US. Political uncertainty, the threat of hyper-
inflation and a potentially violatile social situation make
Argentina a worrisome proposition for the banks.'
The possibility for future cooperative endeavors on the
South American continent are clearly important for both
Argentina's and Brazil's national security and development
considerations. Rapproachment between these two giants has
opened up numerous other opportunities for relationships and
joint ventures with other Latin American countries.
For Brazil, access to markets, stable suppliers of
required energy and raw materials, and the ability of
capital will continue to be a driving force in national
decision making. For Argentina, a new government will be
faced with reestablishing political stability in the after-
math of the Falklands War. The new junta, which took office
in September, 1982 has said it is committed to restoring
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democracy by 1984. 10 Brazil has also shown a tendency
toward liberalization of some of its internal policies but
both countries' economic troubles hamper this development.
The world needs both a steady Argentina and Brazil.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Developing countries like Argentina and Brazil continue
to face domestic and external constraints that restrict the
available options for their foreign policy. The political
and economic power they have achieved within recent decades
has enabled them to make their own decisions regardless of
the desires of the United States. Argentina and Brazil
still value friendly ties with the United States, but they
no longer look to Washington for guidance in choosing their
foreign policy priorities. They are confident in how they
deploy their political, economic and military resources in
pursuit of their policy objectives. They have produced new
opportunities for international and regional cooperation
that will benefit them. They have converged bilaterally,
but competition between Argentina and Brazil must always be
counted on, as tension continues to exist in their joint
relationship, especially within the sphere of economic
relations.
The primary foreign policy goals for both Argentina and
Brazil continue to be enhanced national security and greater
economic development. Both Argentina and Brazil have been
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severely affected by the world economic recession and the
threat of rising debts have created havoc with their econ-
omic development policies. Argentina and Brazil both
believe that their well-being depends on their individual
economic development policies and their foreign policy
priorities are geared with this in mind. Brazil is in a
better position to deal with its current problems, but its
continuing need for oil makes her position more vulnerable
than Argentina's.
Both Argentina and Brazil continue to be ruled by
authoritian regimes, which possess the trappings of democra-
tic nations. They both seek to be acknowledged as interna-
tional players, but are cautious in their foreign policy
objectives. Argentina, in light of her recent disasterous
encounter with Great Britain, will probably endeavor to tone
its policies down for the time being. Both countries,
because of their relatively powerful positions as developing
countries in Latin America, will give higher priority to
bilateral relations than to regional economic cooperative
efforts. They both have concerns with the Third World, but
their orientation will turn more and more to interactions
with the developed world. They perceive themselves as des-
tined to play a world role. Brazil has surpassed Argentina
as the strongest regional power and competition will remain
in this arena. However, these two developing countries will
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continue to cooperate more closely because they perceive it
as a beneficial relationship for themselves.
Both Argentina and Brazil possess the economic and in-
ternal psychological unity necessary to support an indepen-
dent stance on the international stage. At the same time,
both Argentina and Brazil are astute enough to recognize the
advantages to be gained by working together, and to stress
their bilateral relations with other nations within the
region. They are able to pursue as independent a foreign
policy as they desire. If these two nations continue to
steer this independent course they must be prepared to take
the risks and pay the price. One may say that Argentina did
not successfully evaluate the risks involved to the country
when they began the Falklands conflict.
Finally, although Argentina and Brazil realistically
acknowledge and appreciate their historical and cultural
ties with the West neither country will be swayed by this
influence. Each has often resorted to volatile polemics to
display their dissatisfaction with their large neighbor to
the North and their previous colonial overlords. In the
world today, Argentina and Brazil prefer to operate from a
position of strength and this above all represents their
need to pursue independent foreign policies. As in the
cases of all nations today, certain forms of dependency
exists and Argentina and Brazil are certainly no exception
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